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28 JANUARY 1987

Southeast Asia Report

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INDONESIA

SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN URGED

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 10 Dec 86 pp A5, A6

[Text] Jakarta, December 10 (ANTARA) - Indonesia's position on Afghanistan has always been clear and firm pursuant to the Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and the Bandung Spirit, and in line with the UN and Islamic Conference Organization resolutions demanding for the Afghan people the right of selfdetermination without foreign interference.

Deputy Speaker of Parliament and concurrently member of the Indonesia-Afghanistan Peoples Solidarity Committee (KSRIA) Presidium H. Nuddin Lubis pointed this out in a KSRIA press release, issued here Wednesday in connection with the upcoming holding of the Indonesia-Afghanistan Peoples Solidarity Week in Jakarta from December 20 through 27, 1986.

He further stated that the resolutions issued by international organizations, calling for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, had the full support of civilized and peaceful nations.

Indonesia, as frequently proclaimed by its leaders, has always been consistent in its attitude on Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Nuddin Lubis said in the press release.

He also called for the Soviet troops to stop the massacre of innocent people, mainly of civilians, consisting of children, women and old people. The Afghan crisis should immediately be settled, he said, through withdrawal of foreign troops from that country, giving the people the freedom to determine their own future for themselves, Nuddin Lubis said.

MUI general chairman

The general chairman of the MUI Pusat (Central Indonesian Ulama Council), K.H. Hasan Basri, has stressed that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is contradictory to religion and humanity and violates basic human rights and decency.

In this connection he pointed out MUI's decision calling for Indonesian and world Moslems to support the struggle of the Afghan people.

He also called for the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and to leave the people to determine their own future.

The intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan which occurred on October 27, 1979, will be commemorated by KSRIA through various activities, such as lectures and joint prayers by the ulamas.

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CSO: 4200/254

INDONESIA

LOG EXPORTS TO TAIWAN TO STOP

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 15 Dec 86 pp A6, A7

[Text] Jakarta, Dec 15 (ANTARA) - The Indonesian government will in a not too distant future impose a ban on the export of pulp wood to Taiwan, Minister of Forestry Soedjarwo said here Monday after addressing a national workshop on rattan attended by 80 participants.

Although Indonesia since 1985 had imposed a ban on log exports, Taiwan still imported 61,076 cubic meters of pulp wood from Indonesia in the form of logs estimated at US\$ 2.9 million (Rp 4.6 billion) from January through April 1986.

In April only, Taiwan's log imports from Indonesia totalled 5,938 cubic meters worth US\$ 324,000.

Soedjarwo, meanwhile, said the wood exported to Taiwan was not covered by the ban, because the commodity was pulp wood used as raw material in the manufacture of chipwood. Pulp wood, he added, with a maximum length of two meters and a diameter of not exceeding 30 cm, are not covered by the government ban.

The ban clamped on the export of pulp wood in the form of logs, he said, is aimed at protecting the domestic chipwood industry.

Pursuant to a regulation, forest concessionaires, including those dealing with pulpwood, are required to build the necessary chipmills.

But it appeared that they preferred exporting their products in the form of logs, as the purchaser, Taiwan, also preferred it in logs which are usually lower in price.

/13046
CSO: 4200/254

DAMAGE TO SOIL, FORESTS INCREASING

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 11 Dec 86 p A8

[Text] Jakarta, December 11 (ANTARA) - The current damage inflicted soil and forest area is estimated at more than 40 million hectares and this will increase in the coming PELITA V (fifth five-year development plan, 1989-1994) to 50.5 million hectares if no sufficient prevention and rehabilitation measures are taken.

Forestry Minister Sudjarwo pointed this out here Thursday, adding that for the prevention of damage to soil and forest areas among other things reforestation should be carried out, which this year would be announced by President Soeharto on December 17.

The announcement of the National Reforestation Week, he said, will take place at Arjasari village, Pameungpeuk district, Bandung regency in West Java, namely at the experimental gardens of Pajajaran University in Bandung, about 34 kilometers south of Bandung on the road to Pangalengan.

Through this National Reforestation Week a growing awareness on the importance of forests, soil and water could be expected with regard to their utilization in the interest of people and country as well as on the disasters they could cause if their conditions are damaged, the minister said.

Damage to soil and forests will continue to increase each year, if utilization of the soil will exceed the soil's capability and no efforts will be carried out for conservation as well as rejuvenation to replace felled trees. Other causes are among others forest fires, he added.

The 26-th National Reforestation Week, which will take place from December 17 through 23 has as its theme "Reforestation for an Optimum Agricultural Production of Dry Soil, Preservation of Natural Resources and Public Welfare".

Super priority for 22 DAS

Forestry Minister Sudjarwo further explained, in PELITA IV concerted efforts for land rehabilitation and soil conservation have been carried out, giving top priority to 36 DAS (river catchment areas), with 22 among them receiving super priority.

The Bengawan Solo, Brantas, Citarum, Cisadane and Cimanuk river catchment areas are the ones in Java which will receive super priority treatment, the minister said.

The other DAS areas are in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan.

/13046
CSO: 4200/254

FURTHER DROP IN USE OF OIL AS ENERGY SOURCE EXPECTED

Jakarta BUSINESS NEWS in English 12 Dec 86 pp 5, 6

[Text]

The Directorate of Electricity and Renewable Energy Sources will in the current Pelita IV (fourth five-year development plan) continue the efforts to further reduce the consumption of oil by developing the utilization of other energy sources to meet the demand for commercial energy.

The share of oil in the procurement of energy is expected to drop from 77.91% at the end of Pelita III (1983/84) to 62.43% at the end of the current Pelita IV (1988/89), while the share of non-oil energy sources is projected to grow from 22.09% to 37.5% in the same period, Director General for Electricity and Renewable Energy Sources Aris Munandar disclosed at a meeting with Parliamentary Commission VI here recently.

The growth in the use of each non-oil energy source is expected to be small, but increase in the use of those non-oil sources as a whole will be big enough in the 1983/84 - 1988/89 period.

The use of natural gas is projected to grow by 48.65% from 37.2 million BOE to 55.2 million BOE, coal from 1.1 million BOE to 28.2 million BOE and hydropower energy from 7.8 million BOE to 24.3 million BOE.

The use of energy sources for the procurement of commercial energy supply in 1984/85 and 1985/86, and the projection in 1986/87, 1987/88 and 1988/89 is as follows: (in barrels of oil equivalent - BOE).

	1984/85	%	1985/86	%	1986/87	%	1987/88	%
Coal	5,201	(2.3)	11,297	(4.3)	13,602	(5.4)	20,372	(7.5)
Natural gas	40,805	(18.4)	46,176	(19.6)	52,682	(20.2)	54,794	(20.2)
Hydropower energy	16,094	(7.2)	16,945	(7.2)	20,257	(8.1)	21,517	(7.9)
Geothermal energy	0,515	(0.2)	0,515	(0.2)	0,547	(0.2)	1,894	(0.7)
Oil	159,032	(71.9)	160,806	(62.2)	164,694	(65.4)	172,258	(63.7)
Total	221,647	(100.0)	235,739	(100.0)	251,782	(100.0)	270,835	(100.0)

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CSO: 4200/253

INDONESIA

VALUE OF LNG EXPORTS DOWN, OIL EXPORTS UP

Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 15 Dec 86 p A2

[Text] Jakarta, December 15 (ANTARA) - The export value of Liquefied Natural GAS (LNG) from Indonesia in the first ten months of 1986 (January to October) dropped by 20.4 per cent compared with that of the same period in the previous year, data gathered by ANTARA from Bank Indonesia (the central bank) showed Monday.

Indonesian LNG export value in the first ten months of 1985 was noted at 3,152 million US dollars, while from January to October this year it reached only 2,436 million US dollars or a drop of about 716 million US dollars.

The 1986 export mainly came from the Badak refinery (with a value of 1,163 million US dollars) and the Arun refinery (1,273 million US dollars).

The LNG were mostly shipped to Japan while the shipment to South Korea is still in the trial stage.

The Indonesian biggest export of LNG took place in 1985, i.e., about 3,802 US dollars in value followed by those in 1984 worth 3,470 US dollars.

In the first ten months of this year, the biggest export was reached in February (worth 352.65 million US dollars), followed by those in March (342.12 million US dollars) and January (339.36 million US dollars) while the lowest export took place in October with a value of only 181.09 million US dollars.

Oil export value increases

Meanwhile, the export value of oil from Indonesia in the first seven months of 1986 (January to July) increased by 11.6 per cent compared with that of the corresponding period last year.

Oil export in the first seven months of 1985 was noted at 5,037 million US dollars while in 1986 it reached 5,622 million US dollars or an increase of about 11.6 per cent.

The export mainly came from the oil fields managed by Pertamina (national oil company) with a value of 2,657 million US dollars and the rest from foreign oil companies (with a value of 2,922 US dollars).

The Indonesian oil were mostly shipped to the US and Japan.

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CSO: 4200/254

EDITORIAL VIEWS COUNTRY'S FOREIGN DEBTS

Jakarta BUSINESS NEWS in English 17 Dec 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Foreign Debts: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul"]

[Text]

The developing countries are desirous of making advancements through economic development. This development requires huge investments. These investments should be financed with domestic savings. But the developing nations are frequently short of such savings. The amount of investments considered adequate for development is 20% of the Gross Domestic Product or more. Such countries as Indonesia, India, PRC etc. each year invest about 22 - 25% of their GDP. Most of the investments have to come from domestic sources because the total of foreign loans has a practical limit, around 5% of GDP. Indonesia, for instance, has a GDP of around US\$ 85 billion, so that 5% amounts to US\$ 4.25 billion.

However, the process of accumulating foreign debts has its own complication. Indonesia's debts at present stand at about US\$ 30 billion worth of government debts and around US\$ 7 billion worth of private business debts. The government each year has to spend more than US\$ 4 billion on the repayment of principal debts plus interest. Say that the repayment of principal debts involves US\$ 2.25 billion, then in order to obtain new capital worth US\$ 4.25 billion the Indonesian government has to seek new loans totalling US\$ 6.5 billion. This is the phenomenon of "robbing Peter to pay Paul" that frequently accompanies the developing countries in their process of development.

The payment of instalments should come from goods and service export revenues. Hence two standards concerning foreign debts are important : the ratio between the amount of debts and exports (debt-service ratio) and the ratio between

the amount of debts and GDP. The former determines the capability of repayment, the latter measures the burden to be borne by society.

The important yardstick of burden is the total of debt instalments and interest to be imposed on the government budget annually. For Indonesia this is no longer small because it already constitutes about one third of the routine expenditure, and is equal to the budget of civil servants' salaries.

So the amount of tax should increase each year only to be able to pay these debt instalments. Is this proper? In fact it is proper because this is (part of) the burden of development financing that should be borne by society.

Borrowing money for the purpose of development means borrowing the savings of others, so that the society in question need not await its development realisation. But it certainly has to pay some "cost".

All the government (and private) debts finally have to be repaid. Hence such loan capital must be productively invested so that the growing economy always has the capability of debt servicing.

When will this theory miss its point in practice? Firstly, if investments meagrely increase national income. Secondly, if exports fail to be parallel or in proportion to debt service increase. Both discrepancies (or mismatches) frequently take place.

Investments, especially in the government sector, can become increasingly less productive. One of the standards is the rising capital-output ratio (the ratio between new investments and GDP increase). This has happened in Indonesia, where this c.o.r. has risen from 2 (in the first Five-Year Plan period) to over 4 (in the fourth). The same phenomenon takes place in India. It shows that many government investments are less complete, finished with a delay, slow in production, too expensive, and so forth.

The second precaution involves the debt-service ratio, which calls for export increase at the same rate as that of foreign debt increase. In a long period of recession foreign debts are on the rise while exports are just declining. This has been going on in Indonesia since 1983.

What lesson can be drawn from all this? It is difficult to draw anything from it, because the condition can be likened to a (poor) man who has leaking roofs. When it rains, he is unable to repair

the roofs, but when the weather is bright he deems it unnecessary to repair them.

Indonesia has experienced the period of transition since 1982/83. Each year it feels compelled to increase its debts to relieve the burden of life. When will the roofs be repaired?

/13046
CSO: 4200/253

INDONESIA

BRIEFS

USE OF DOMESTIC COTTON REQUIRED--Director General for Multifarious Manufacturing Industries Ir. Sotion Ardjanggi has required all spinning mills operating in Indonesia to use local cotton as their basic material to absorb cotton yielded by local cotton plantations during the first harvest season in 1986/87. The stipulation which requires spinning mills to process local cotton is contained in the Decree of the Director General for Multifarious Manufacturing Industries No. 1888/DJAI/XII/1986 dated December 4, 1986. In accordance with the October 25 Package, the transaction for the purchase of local cotton is managed by spinning mills in direct contacts with suppliers, comprising joint marketing offices of state-run plantation companies and PT.PP Berdikari/Pt. KII. The opening of L/C in foreign exchange banks for the import of cotton fibre registered under CCCN 55.01.000 requires proofs of the purchase of local cotton. The stipulation has been made in connection with the beginning of the 1986/1987 harvest season. In the first stage of the 1986/87 harvest season, the cotton production in the country has reached 23,000 bale. The stipulation is effective for 88 companies operating spinning mills in Indonesia. They have the obligation of buying 23,000 bales of local cotton in the first stage of the 1986/87 harvest season. [Text]
Jakarta BUSINESS NEWS in English 12 Dec 86 p 5] /13046

ADB AID FOR PUBLIC WORKS TECHNICIANS--The Manila-based Asian Development Bank has approved a \$ 29 million loan to Indonesia for a project designed to improve the operational efficiency of the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) by meeting its future needs for well-trained technicians. The loan, approved today, is from the Bank's ordinary capital resources. It has a term of 20 years, including a six-year grace period, with interest determined in accordance with the Bank's pool-based variable lending rate system. Although richly endowed with natural resources, Indonesia lacks skilled manpower. In particular, the MPW -- the major government agency providing infrastructure support in the development of agriculture, industry, highways and bridges, the construction industry, rural and urban areas, public health and trans-migration programs -- is faced with severe shortage of technical manpower. The direct beneficiaries will be 1,620 skilled workers who will be trained as technicians, and 600 technicians already employed with MPW and the line agencies who will undergo skills upgrading through short-term courses. The project will also provide staff with opportunities to advance professionally while ensuring that training is relevant to needs. Those who successfully complete the LPPU diploma courses will be eligible for promotion to higher grades and will be able to improve their earning potential, social mobility and, ultimately, their living standards. [Text] [Jakarta BUSINESS NEWS in English 19 Dec 86 p 9] /13046

NEW OIL DISCOVERY--Jakarta, Dec 11 (ANTARA) - Atlantic Richfield Indonesia, Inc., one of Pertamina's production sharing contractors, recently struck oil in the NF-1 exploration well at the rate of 3000 barrels per day. The well is located off Java's northwest coast, some 150 kms north of Jakarta. A Pertamina spokesman said a test has shown that the maximum production capacity of the well could reach over 6000 barrels of oil per day. The NF-1 exploration well is one of the recently found wells some 2.8 kms south of the Karmila field which will be developed. [Text] [Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 11 Dec 86 p A 1] /13046

TRANSMIGRATION TO CENTRAL KALIMANTAN--Palangka Raya, December 10 (ANTARA) - As many as 35,054 families of 146,248 transmigrant people have been resettled in Central Kalimantan up to the third year of the current Fourth Five Year Development Plan, the head of the regional office of the ministry of transmigration, Heru Santoso, told the press Wednesday. The population of Central Kalimantan, which covers 153,800 square kilometers, is only inhabited by 1.22 million or at the rate of eight people per square kilometer, making it difficult to execute development plans in the region. According to demographic experts Central Kalimantan is able to accommodate as many as 10 million people. [Text] [Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 10 Dec 86 p A6] /13046

PLANNED TRANSMIGRATION TO IRIAN--Jayapura, Dec. 10 (ANTARA) - As many as 109,800 transmigrant families were scheduled to be resettled at various transmigration sites in six out of the nine regencies in Irian Jaya, during the current fourth five-year development (1984-1989), it was said here Wednesday. According to the Regional Transmigration office, 13,500 families would be resettled in Merauke regency, 46,000 families in Jayapura, 14,800 families in Sorong, 5,000 families in Manokwari and 4,000 in Yapen Waropen. The breakdown of the plan is as follows: 20,400 families in 1984/1985, 15,400 families in 1985/1986, 19,500 families in 1986/1987, 26,500 families in 1987/1988 and 28,000 families in 1988/1989. The plan would be adjusted to the budget available each year, it was said. [Text] [Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 10 Dec 86 p A2] /13046

TRANSMIGRATION FROM WEST JAVA--Jakarta, December 12 (ANTARA) - Some 98,254 volunteer transmigrant families, comprising 267,066 people, from West Java have been resettled in various regions in Indonesia in the third year of PELITA IV (fourth five-year development plan, 1984-1989). The transmigration ministry's spokesman said Thursday that during the same period 118,225 transmigrants families covering 348,329 persons in all, from West Java had been resettled. Among the transmigrants were 10,323 families or 45,559 people who had to give way to development projects in their regions. During November 1986 alone, West Java sent 1,946 transmigrants, mostly from Cianjur, Tangerang and Indramayu regencies, for resettlement at transmigration sites in Irian Jaya, Bengkulu, East Kalimantan, Aceh, Riau and Jambi, the spokesman said. [Text] [Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 12 Dec 86 p A6] /13046

ASEAN FERTILIZER PLANT OUTPUT, PROFIT--Lhokseumawe, Dec. 10 (ANTARA) - The Iskandar Muda fertilizer plant, an ASEAN joint project, had reached its annual peak output last year which totalled 570,000 tonnes and generated a profit of Rp. 6.9 billion. The plant's spokesman, Hamid Hasan, said Tuesday that the plant built in 1982 had yielded its first "maiden" production totalling 570,000 tonnes of urea last year. Cooperating with the Sriwijaya fertilizer plant it had succeeded in marketing 435,894 tonnes of urea and 800,700 tonnes of ammonia worth, giving it a total profit of Rp. 6.9 billion in 1985. (US\$ 1 equals Rp. 1,600). Inaugurated by President Soeharto in 1985, the plant has absorbed 1,019 workers. Hamid said the industrial plant located in Lhokseumawe, North Aceh, could uplift the living standard of the surrounding people as well as small scale businessmen and handcraftmen. The Iskandar Muda fertilizer plant has awarded the government's Upakarti medal, a token given to company and individual rendering outstanding achievement in the field of industry. [Text] [Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN in English 10 Dec 86 p A 1] /13046

CSO: 4200/254

UNHCR PROJECTS FOR REFUGEES DESCRIBED

Bangkok THE NATION in English 10 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Pratya Sawetvimon]

[Text]

THE UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is extending four more projects into three provinces of Laos to help reintegrate former Laotian refugees in their community.

Pierre Von Gunten, the UNHCR representative in Vientiane, the Laotian capital, said the projects will be carried out in Champasak and Khammouan provinces in southern Laos as well as in Luang Nam Tha Province in the north.

He said the projects have been designed to help reintegrate the Laotian refugees, who return to their homeland under the UNHCR-sponsored voluntary repatriation programme, into their society.

So far a total of 2,953 Laotians have returned from refugee camps in Thailand to Laos under the programme which was instituted in 1980.

Seven similar reintegration projects are being carried out with a budget of US\$804,000 in other Laotian provinces, said the UNHCR representative.

Plans to establish new projects of the same type in several different provinces are being made for next year, said Gunten. The plans will be based on an assessment of the needs of both the Laotian returnees

under the UNHCR auspices and those who return spontaneously, he added.

Gunten said the projects typically provide for the construction and equipping of schools and dispensaries, the construction or repairing of irrigation reservoirs, canals and water-gates, the provision of tools, seeds and other inputs for agriculture or perhaps the provision of equipment as well as teaching aid and scholarships for vocational training for young urban returnees.

He said that 14 projects have been implemented in seven Laotian provinces since 1980 and a budget of over US\$3,727,000 has been spent.

He said the UNHCR projects, with cooperation from the Laotian government authorities, help improve basic village-level social and economic infrastructure to permit real reintegration and economic self-sufficiency over the long term for the returnees as well as surrounding population in the areas.

Apart from the reintegration projects, the UNHCR also pays for the transportation of the returnees from the border crossing points to the transit centre, where they have to stay for sometimes, and on to the area of their origin.

The returnees under the programme are also provided with resettlement kits composed of essential hand tools, agricultural implements, kitchen utensils and other immediate household needs as well as food. The UNHCR last year spent US\$65,000 under this project.

Gunten said total of 122 Laotian refugees in Thailand are scheduled to return to Laos under the voluntary repatriation programme before the end of this year. The processing for the group was completed last Friday, he added.

He said most of them will cross the Thai-Laotian border into Champasak in southern Laos. There are currently four crossing points — Champasak/Chong Mek and Savannakhet/Mukdahan in the south, Thadeua/Nong Khai near Vientiane and Houei Xay/Chieng Khong in the northwest.

The UNHCR officials in Thailand will accompany the Lao returnees on their trip from refugee camps to the crossing points where they will be joined by the Thai provincial and district officials.

Their personal effects, including assistance items such as clothes, hand tools and sewing kits, will be brought with the returnees.

The Laos-based UNHCR officials and the Laotian government authorities will greet the returnees on the Lao side of the border.

Gunten said a brief reception will be held between the Thai and Laotian delegations and the list of the returnees' names will be signed by representatives from the two governments and the UNHCR.

The returnees will later be taken to the transit centre where they have to stay for a few weeks before taking a trip to their villages or hometowns.

The UNHCR will supply food for the newly-arrived Laotians for a period up to the next harvest season, which may be anywhere from six to twelve months.

The previous reception ceremonies and the returnees' progress towards integration and self-sufficiency have been video-taped, Gunten said.

The video tapes were later shown in the refugee camps in Thailand in order to attract more Laotian refugees to apply for the voluntary repatriation.

The "video-tape campaign" started last year, according to Gunten.

The Vientiane-based representative also expressed his hope that more Laotian refugees will return to Laos under the programme in the near future.

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CSO: 4200/257

PHILIPPINES

UN REJECTS MINDANAO INDEPENDENCE PETITION

HK151423 Hong Kong AFP in English 1405 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Manila, Dec 15 (AFP)--The United Nations has rejected a petition seeking independence for the southern Philippine island of Mindanao because it lacks sympathetic sponsors, the leader of a separatist group said here Monday.

Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) leader Reuben Canoy said that he would nevertheless "submit anew the MIM petition for record purposes."

The group's petition was first submitted to the UN on June 16, but it was not entertained because "it lacked sponsorship by a sympathetic member-nation," he said in a press statement.

Mr Canoy, a former MP and defeated presidential candidate, inaugurated the MIM early this year to project what he called Manila's neglect of the large island, which is engulfed by Muslim separatist and communist insurgency.

The MIM leadership is made up mostly of Christian politicians in the south.

Mr Canoy dared the Foreign Ministry to carry out threats to initiate sedition charges against MIM leaders.

"It is not a crime for the people of Mindanao to assert their right to self-determination," he argued.

Asked about the group's reported attempts to link up with Muslim separatist guerrillas, Mr Canoy said the MIM was linking up "with the Muslim groups that are basically anti-communist."

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES DECLINE 'SIGNIFICANTLY'

HK090321 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 8 Dec 86 p 14

[Text] The incidence of human rights violations has significantly gone down since the government of President Corazon Aquino assumed power last February. Abuses, particularly in the rural areas, continue to be reported, however, on account of the military's unchanged conduct of its counter-insurgency operations, according to a preliminary report of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (Pahra).

Pahra's report, which covered the period of Feb 26 to Sept 30, collated the reports of various human rights organizations. It said that cases of human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings ("salvagings"), arbitrary arrests and torture have markedly declined.

The report cited, for example, the findings of the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) that 88 cases of salvagings were reported during this period, or an average of 12.57 incidents per month. This is less than half the rate of 35.75 cases per month recorded for the whole of 1985 under the Marcos government.

The monthly average of arrests and detentions for political causes (i.e., subversion, rebellion and sedition cases) has dropped from 497.25 per month for the whole of 1985 to 86.14 cases per month for the first seven months of the Aquino government, the Pahra report said.

The total for the period under the Aquino government was 603 arrest cases, while the 1985 sum was 5,967 cases.

The incidence of alleged torture cases also fell from 781 cases in 1985 (or an average of 65 per month) to 238 reported cases in the Feb 26 to Sept 30 period (or an average of 13 per month).

An umbrella group of human rights organizations, Pahra attributed the new trends to the rise of the Aquino government, which "openly proclaimed its adherence to human rights" and organized a presidential body--the presidential committee on human rights--to handle cases of human rights abuses.

The Pahra report, however, called attention to continuing reports of alleged military abuses committed in the course of counter-insurgency operations.

It cited cases of forced evacuations conducted in various areas of the country. "Most significant was the intensified military operation in Cagayan Valley, home region of former Defense Minister (Juan Ponce) Enrile, immediately after the February Revolution. Testimonies of Cagayan refugees indicated that the military operations were more repressive than the previous months. Documentation done by the TFDP and the Ecumenical Commission on Displaced Families and Civilians (Ecdfc) counted 11 cases of mass evacuations in the region," the Pahra report said.

It said that the Ecdfc listed 33 incidents of mass evacuations, involving more than 20,000 families in six regions of the country.

The alliance's report said that "the nature and character of the government counter-insurgency programs and policies account for the continuing deterioration in the countryside." It described present military practices as a "carryover of the repressive practices" of the Marcos government.

"Present military strategy is to eliminate base support for rebel groups by manipulating civilians and civilian communities.

"Practices include the depopulation of whole communities, 'food blockades' or the seizure of food supplies of civilians, crop burning and declaration of certain areas as 'free-fire zones'. Most of the cases of civilian evacuations which occurred after February were preceded by heavy military operations which included artillery bombings of communities, house-to-house searches and raids," the report said.

Pahra's report also cited the continued use of the 70,000-strong Civilian Home Defense Forces [CHDF] in the counter-insurgency drive as another major factor in reports of continuing abuses in rural areas.

"President Aquino had earlier promised to dismantle the CHDF owing to its unpopularity. Strong pressure and continuous lobbying by the military are still preventing her from fulfilling that promise," the report said.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

FOREIGN DEBTS EXCEED \$27 BILLION

HK160339 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 15 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by reporter Daniel C. Yu]

[Text] The country's foreign debt has exceeded \$27 billion as of the end of the third quarter and is now just a shade under \$28 billion, according to Central Bank [CB]-data.

The overall foreign exchange liability at the end of the third quarter totaled \$27,798 million, an increase of 5 percent from \$26,483 million at the end of the first half of this year, the data showed.

The amount of foreign debt puts Philippines in fifth place among the biggest debtor-countries in the world, behind Brazil, Mexico, Argentian and Venezuela.

The increase during the third quarter was mainly accounted for by a revaluation in "third-currency obligations" (currency other than the peso and U.S. dollar) from the historical rates of the exchange rate prevailing on Oct. 31.

Before the revaluation, the CB had projected a yearend total foreign debt of \$26,693 million and \$26,860 million for end-1987.

Of the total foreign exchange liabilities, 64.3 percent consisted of obligations of the non-baking sector and 33.8 percent comprised those of the banking sector. The remaining 1.9 percent were export advances.

Medium- and long-term obligations were \$22,390 million or 80.5 percent of total while liabilities with repayment periods of one year or less amounted to \$5,408 million.

Previously, long- and medium-term obligations were 32.7 percent of total and short-term liabilities; 67.3 percent. The change reflects the impact of rescheduling foreign bank debts falling due from 1983 to 1986.

Debts to foreign commercial banks amounted to abut \$15 billion. Debts to other institutions, suppliers' credit, multilateral and bilateral credits accounted for the remainder.

For every dollar of overall export of goods and services, the country spent more than \$0.45 on payment of foreign debts, leaving less than 55 percent for import requirements and other development needs.

The outstanding level of trade credits covered by a trade financing facility from foreign bank creditors at end-September was \$2,943 million, \$31 million below \$2,974 million committed by the banks.

Of this amount, \$1,280 million was in the form of direct trade credits and \$1,663 million was deposited with the CB.

Gross international reserves at the end of the third quarter totaled \$1,710 million, 6.8 percent higher than the second-quarter level and equivalent to about 2.6 months' import requirements.

From January to September, the Philippines shelled out \$2,961 million or 83.2 percent of its foreign exchange earnings to pay foreign loans and interest.

Total amortization on foreign loan principals at the end of the third quarter reached \$1,372 million while interest expense was \$1,589 million.

For every dollar of foreign exchange earnings, the country paid \$0.83 to repay foreign loans and interest. The interest alone accounted for close to 45 percent of total dollar earnings during the nine-month period.

Philippine Foreign Exchange Liabilities
as of dates indicated
(in million U.S. dollars)
September 30, 1986

	short-term		medium-& long- term	Total
	Trade	Non-trade		
Total	4892	716	22390	27798#
Banking sector	2127	397	6878	9402
1. Commerical				
Banks	459	375	2014	2848
Government	60	200	604	864
Private	339	175	1410	1984
Foreign banks	72	138	68	1278
Domestic banks	327	37	342	706
Central Bank	1668	22	4864	6554

	short-term	medium- & long-term	Total
	Trade	Non-trade	
Non-banking sector	2044	319	15512
1. Public	453	10	13090
2. Private	1581	309	2422
Red clause	521	--	--
1. Public	162	--	--
2. Private	359	--	--

December 31, 1985

	short-term	medium- & long-term	Total
	Trade	Non-trade	
Total	4854	3719	17679
Banking sector	2130	2852	3894
1. Commercial banks	383	2095	475
Government	43	345	448
Private	335	1750	27
Foreign banks	91	1109	5
Domestic Banks	244	641	22
Central Bank	1747	757	3419
Non-banking sector	2482	867	13785
1. Public	780	405	11172
2. Private	1702	461	2613
Red Clause	242	--	--
1. Public	--	--	--
2. Private	242	--	--

September 30, 1985

Total	5307	3611	15633	25555
Banking sector	2166	2936	3305	8407
1. Commercial banks	708	2003	509	3220
Government	432	407	319	1158

	Trade	Non-trade	short-term	medium- & long-term	Total
Private	276	1596	190	2062	
Foreign banks	40	844	166	1050	
Domestic banks	236	752	24	1012	
Central Bank	1458	933	2796	5187	
Non-banking sector	2760	675	13333	16763	
1. Public	1065	353	10188	11605	
2. Private	1695	322	3145	5162	
Red clause	381	--	--	381	
1. Public	191	--	--	191	
2. Private	190	--	--	190	

#Revalued, using exchange rates as of Oct. 31, 1986

Source: Financial Plan Data Center Reported dated Nov. 25, 1986, Feb. 19, 1986 and Nov. 5, 1985

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CSO: 4200/243

AQUINO ORDERS NEGROS LAND-LEASE INVESTIGATION

HK160143 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 15 Dec 86 p 16

[Text] President Corazon Aquino has moved to check one of the major causes of the insurgency problem in Negros Occidental by ordering a study of the 60-30-10 land lease purchase arrangement proposed by Gov. Daniel Lacson.

Under the arrangement, 60 percent of a certain hectarage of sugarland will be retained by the sugar planter, 30 percent will be given up to the government and the remaining 10 percent will be allotted to sugar workers. Land to be given up by the sugar planters will be properly compensated for through a land lease-purchase arrangement.

The total 40 percent portion of land that sugar planters will give up will be planted to crops other than sugar.

This requirement is in line with the government's crop diversification program for the province where most people have, since the late 1970s, been suffering from poverty due to the decline in world sugar prices.

The sugar industry's losses have especially hit Negros Occ. whose economy is virtually dependent on sugar.

In Memorandum Order 56 signed Dec. 11, the President directed the formation of a six-man task force to study the 60-30-10 land lease purchase arrangement.

Agrarian Reform Minister Heherson Alvarez heads the task force with Agriculture and Food Minister Ramon Mitra Jr., National Economic and Development Authority Director-General Solita Monsod, Gov. Lacson, a representative each of the Philippine National Bank [PNB], and the Presidential Management Staff under the Office of the President as well as two representatives from the Negros Council Forum as members.

The scheme was first proposed by Lacson when the President flew to Negros last October. It aims to put order to the redistribution of some 10,000 hectares of foreclosed sugar lands by the PNB worth an estimated P10 billion, representing debts owned by landowners. Negros prelate Monsignor Antonio Fortich endorsed the scheme to the President although it is reportedly meeting with stiff resistance among sugar planters.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

VOTER REGISTRANTS SAID TO TOTAL 90 PERCENT

Comelec Report

HK150255 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 14 Dec 86

[Text] Commission on Elections [Comelec] chairman Ramon Felipe Jr said about 90 percent of the estimated 25 million voters registered at the close of the 4-day registration yesterday [14 December]. Felipe said most of the registrants were recorded during the last 2 days of the registration. Except in some critical areas where registrations were not held, the political exercise was generally peaceful and orderly. Reports received at the Comelec's central office said that some voters failed to register in critical areas [words indistinct] islands and in some places in TawiTawi, the country's most southernmost province. Lack of registration forms also compounded the problems in these areas. But the Comelec chairman said registration in these places would be scheduled for a later date. All regional and provincial Comelec offices reported a good turn-out of registrants. Felipe attributed the good turn-out to the people's eagerness to participate in the forthcoming local and national elections and to their new-found freedom.

In Metro Manila, isolated incidents of flying voters and fake Comelec registrations have been discovered by concerned citizens, particularly in Makati, Pasay, Navotas and Valenzuela. [Words indistinct] people have been rounded up for questioning in Metro Manila for presenting fake registration identification cards. Among those arrested were those found registering more than twice.

Aquino Comments

HK151328 Hong Kong AFP in English 1254 GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] Manila, Dec 15 (AFP)--President Corazon Aquino said Monday that 23.6 million people were qualified to vote in the February 2 plebiscite for the ratification of the new Philippine constitution, and for legislative polls in May.

Mrs Aquino, who has staked the future of her government on the new constitution, said she was pleased by the results of the four-day weekend voter

enlistment which began sluggishly on December 6 and ended with a heavy turnout Sunday.

"The turnout reached the figure of about 90 percent of an estimated 26.2 million voters," Mrs Aquino said in a press statement, quoting preliminary estimates by the government's election watchdog body, the Commission on Elections.

"This is certainly very heartening," she added.

The new lists are to be used in the February 2 plebiscite and national election on May 11 if the draft charter is ratified.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL CRITICIZES VOTER REGISTRATION INTERFERENCE

HK091531 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 9 Dec 86 p 6

[Editorial: Guns at the Polls]

[Text] The Comelec [Commission on Elections] should investigate Mr. Jejomar Binay, the OIC [Officer-in-charge] of Makati, and Mr. Teddy Macapagal, the Olongapo OIC, both of whom reportedly interfered with the registration of voters last weekend. They reportedly went around the precincts with their bodyguards openly carrying guns in defiance of the firearms ban. The Makati OIC and his men reportedly arrested people inside the precincts.

These incidents have to be investigated because the Comelec cannot allow such things to stain the Aquino administration, which is committed to clean polls.

Philippine experience with elections and plebiscites is extensive enough to allow for certain generalizations about the conduct of the polls. Thus, it can be stated that while cheating and terrorism cannot be entirely avoided, especially in the provinces, the prevalence and the complexion of these acts change dramatically when they are inspired by government officials, such as mayors, provincial governments or law enforcers.

If the acts are not officially inspired, they are done very surreptitiously. But if they are done on orders from responsible government officials, they are done quite openly and with seeming impunity.

Where the criminal violations of the election law are done with official sanction, the population is almost helpless. If they are done without official sanction, democracy remains vigorous despite the anomalies because the citizens are sure that the government will prosecute the offenders.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL LAUDS DEFENSE MINISTRY 'DEMILITARIZATION'

HK041445 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 4 Dec 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Back to the Barracks"]

[Text] Actions speak louder than words. The "demilitarization" of the Ministry of National Defense [MND] by Minister Rafael Ileto emphatically projected the ebb of tensions and the return of normalcy in the once most "sensitive" area of the government.

The return to the NAFF [New Armed Forces of the Philippines] of the 10 armored personnel carriers by the MND dramatized that the state of suspicion and anxiety that used to grip Camp Aguinaldo has subsided.

More importantly, the move brings back the MND to its original role--a civil government ministry that oversees the armed forces and the top policy-making body of the defense establishment. And not an operating military arm with a formidable striking capability.

The Ileto message was subtle. But, in the language of the militarymen, it was "loud and clear."

Recently, the erstwhile combat officer, who had been directly involved in the counter-insurgency campaign, showed on television that he could be at ease discussing peace with the former supremo of the NPA, Bernabe Buscayno.

The tight security around former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile may have been a necessity. After all, he had sparked the February "revolt" against ousted President Marcos. Undoubtedly, Enrile was, and remains, a prime target of the more violent remnants of the former regime, some of whom are still in the military. The result was a siege syndrome.

Ileto, although involved in the February Revolution, managed to remain more of a professional rather than a political figure despite his appointment as deputy minister of defense. Thus, it was easier for him to reestablish rapport among the military officers, many of them his former students and subordinates.

President Aquino, as NAFF commander-in-chief, most likely must have consulted Ileto and top officers of the military before issuing the various directives Tuesday that relieved some of the long-standing disparities in the treatment of PMA [Philippine Military Academy] graduates and reservists.

This, more than any other, was the Achilles heel of the NAPP. And, of course, the frustration of many poorly-paid and ill-equipped soldiers who, often, had to spend for their own uniforms and forage for food while on combat missions.

By eliminating some of the basic causes of discontent among reserve officers who felt they were being discriminated against, the President appears to be on the way to solidifying the military establishment.

Again, that demonstrated that the communication gap between the defense establishment and Malacanang has been bridged. That, by itself, should elicit sighs of relief from the citizenry.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

COLUMNIST SUPPORTS MILITARY'S REFORM PLANS

HK160137 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 15 Dec 86 p 5

["Political Tidbits" column by Belinda Olivares Cunanan]

[Text] To my mind there were two factors in the Marcos regime which led to the galloping growth of the New People's Army [NPA], from a few hundreds at the outset of martial law, to a reported 22,000 armed regulars by the time the dictator fled to Hawaii. These were the unabated corruption in certain sectors of the civilian government and the corruption and abuses, notably in the field of human rights, in some sectors of the military. These two issues were seized upon by the dissident forces to alienate the people from the civilian leadership and the armed forces, which were portrayed as instruments to prop up the dictatorship.

Today both the new civilian and military leadership in government seem to recognize this and seek to address the problems in their respective establishments. And I dare say that to the degree in which both sectors are successful in addressing these problems would depend, after all the negotiations with the National Democratic Front (NDF) are through, a great deal of the success in tackling the dissident problem.

Of course, there are other areas that remain to be addressed, the major one of which is the glaring disparity between rich and poor in this country; but this can be dealt a big blow with an aggressive land reform program which has two components, the leadership's sincerity to push it, and the availability of funds to provide the support structures that are absolutely necessary to the success of land reform.

But more immediately felt, and perhaps truly dramatic in impact, would be the campaign against civilian and military corruption and military abuses. It is heartening to note that there appears to be sincere effort to tackle these monsters by the horn, beginning with Cory Aquino's bureaucratic revamp (which we hope would be continuing) and the reorientation and value-formation programs of the military.

Incidentally, the NDF is said to have realized that their "show of force" last week in Samal, Bataan, which saw some 75 fully armed, fatigue-uniformed NPAs

come down from the hills to "provide escort" for the NDF panel's much-publicized visit there had boomeranged on them. They are said to have realized that this show of strength had turned off many citizens all over the country, who saw the event on TV and in the papers.

The same is true of the effect of the NDF's graffiti war on Metro Manila in the last two weeks, which saw them painting blistering red slogans all over blank walls in both public and private properties. The average citizens do not like vandalism and want their city clean; and they realize that to repaint those walls would cost the taxpayer so much money again.

In the fact of this naked display of force, which some citizens interpreted as "provocation," the military, by contrast, looked extremely sober, patient, responsible and righteously indignant but still wanting to keep their part of the bargain. The NDF appeared to be the spoilers this time. It also did not help them that the majority of both local and foreign media were lionizing them and portraying them as conquering heroes. I got the feeling the overkill reminded citizens of the way the media glamorized the RAM [Reform the Armed Forces Movement] boys after the Revolution--look what happened to them in the end.

In a speech delivered last Saturday afternoon before the Christian Democratic International (CDI) AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel V. Ramos sought to address the propaganda warfare between rebels and military by highlighting on-going reforms in the military.

Stressing that the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP) has launched what he calls the "conscientization of the military," which, in turn, entails "moral re-direction" and the creation of "a new way of thinking, a new culture in the military that involves the reestablishment of martial traditions started by Andres Bonifacio and other heroes of the first Revolution.

Part of this conscientization, said Ramos, is making clear to the men in uniform, particularly after the disastrous coup attempts of last month that the NAFP "will not be a power broker...but must and will always remain a bulwark of national stability." This means, he said, assisting the national government in creating conditions and in strengthening the foundations for the development of democratic institutions."

One important foundation, he pointed out, "is civilian supremacy over the military." He noted that two statements of consensus and concern issued by the senior commanders of the military leadership on Sept. 9 and Oct. 22 "reiterated their full and unequivocal support to civilian authority" even as they stressed the need for a "total approach" to the country's security problems. Ramos said the NAFP has placed itself "squarely in the center of the spectrum of Philippine society" between the godless and materialistic communist forces, and the ultra-rightist group of crony warlords, both of which resort to armed violence.

Ramos stressed that the present, intensive value-formation of the soldiers seeks to transform them into "god-centered and nation-focused men" and professionals with "a strong sense of purpose and an enduring sense of uprightness." Taking up a minimum of 20 hours in all training modules of the NAFFP, Ramos pointed out, is an emphasis on respect for individual human rights, and he noted the immediate effect in a recent report of the Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates. It said that human rights violations in the country nationwide have decreased from an average of 36 cases per month in 1985 to 12 cases per month in 1986, or a dramatic decrease of 67 percent.

Ramos also pointed out that during the ceasefire period, the NAFFP would take advantage of the ensuring peace to intensify civic action and other forms of public service of the men in uniform, such as building of infrastructures, medical assistance and technical support to the rural areas, side by side with the civilian government's pouring of some P1 billion into the more troubled parts of the countryside.

Many citizens are going to await such periodic reports from the chief of staff about ongoing reforms in the military, as they realize this would considerably stabilize the country. The military seems to be in the right direction.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL CRITICIZES REMOVAL OF LEFTIST MINISTERS

HK081541 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 6 Dec 86 p 9

[Editorial: "Political Test in Employment"]

[Text] The Cabinet Revamp was generally acknowledged as necessary, prompted by the shortcomings which surfaced with the initial organization of the Aquino Government after Marcos' hasty departure. The logical perception was that the reorganization was some kind of rectification for those shortcomings.

It was therefore unfortunate that Mrs Aquino's spokesmen should give the current reorganization the appearance of a political check. Initially, the reorganization had been demanded by then Defense Minister Juan Ponce-Enrile to weed out so-called leftists in the Cabinet. Enrile was riding on the more general request of the military that issues directly pertaining to their welfare be addressed. Now we have Gen. Fidel V. Ramos' admission that he had indeed submitted certain recommendations containing, we assume, those general demands of the armed forces personnel. Although General Ramos said the recommendations included the reorganization of the Cabinet, the basis for it related more properly to the issue of performance rather than politics.

The insistence on the political reasons for the reorganization introduces an entirely different dimension to the president's actions. If we are to believe the latest reports, two organizations--Partido ng Bayan [PNB--People's Party] and Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU--1 May Movement] have already voiced their apprehension that the Cabinet revamp may indeed be some sort of silent coup intended to install a more pro-American Cabinet.

The facts are not yet fully revealed, although the skeptical find some bases for the perception of the two organizations that have articulated the criticism.

For instance, every one, except perhaps the really unenlightened, knows that not one of those sacked from ministerial positions is Leftist. Mrs Aquino was more candid in her letter to the former minister of natural resources, Ernesto Macea, that the reason for her decision was allegations of corruption. Even on that matter, however, the president herself has no proof nor does she give it any credibility.

The same may be said of the case of the former minister of public works and highways, Rogaciano Mercado. In the case of Aquilino Pimentel, the public outcry was not so much over corruption as over instances of the former minister of local government's injudiciousness in the appointments of OICs [Officers-in-charge]. Minister of Labor Augusto Sanchez has been loudly criticized not for his performance but for his so-called pro-labor tendencies. Both Pimentel and Sanchez, however, have been named by Rightists as among the "leftists" in the Cabinet.

It is on these political and ideological considerations that the reorganization reveals certain controversial aspects. Granted that Sanchez is a pro-labor (and recent decisions of his would seem to contradict this), isn't this attitude or personal philosophy expected of the minister of labor? It would have been funny if we had a minister of labor who was staunchly anti-labor. For the adjudication of disputes is guided by existing laws which, when examined, may appear to be more pro-capital.

But the issue has already been articulated; controversy may intensify later. It would have been simpler for the Aquino Government to have insisted on the criteria of performance and not on other considerations. If Mrs Aquino is indeed bent on institutionalizing a democratic dispensation for our society, then it behooves her Government to respect pluralism of beliefs. Being a Centrist government does not mean eliminating the left or the Right, or denying one the right to work and employment while allowing the other to monopolize opportunities. It means, rather, allowing both to be expressed without compromising the Government independent policies.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

1 BILLION PESO RECONCILIATION PROGRAM SET FOR REBELS

HK111441 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 11 Dec 86 pp 1, 12

[Article by Ding Marcelo]

[Text] In a move to make the ceasefire work and at the same time convince insurgents to join the mainstream of society, the government yesterday announced the setting up of a P1-billion reconciliation and development program for the countryside.

The program was announced in the Cabinet meeting during which President Aquino and her ministers were apprised of the cease-fire agreement which took effect yesterday.

In a statement marking the beginning of the 60-day cease-fire, the president enjoined both sides to exert their best efforts to respect the letter and intent of the agreement.

"If they live up to the spirit that motivated it, we shall have peace in this season that particularly calls for it," Mrs Aquino said.

The P1-billion program which takes effect Jan. 1, 1987, was prepared by a committee headed by Herminio Aquino, deputy executive secretary for human settlements.

He said there will be two components for the program. First, the government will initiate countryside development to transform insurgent-influenced areas into self-managing and self-reliant communities. Second, it will set up an integration program to assist rebel-returnees resume normal lives.

Aquino said the program will be implemented in 17,700 barangays where the poorest 30 percent of the population live and where, he said, the New People's Army presence is felt most.

As the ceasefire moved into effect, Audit Chairman Teofisto Guingona Jr. of the government negotiating panel urged both the military and National Democratic Front forces to exercise caution in the initial days of the cease-fire while guidelines and identifying signs are being formulated.

Only two days ago, the cease-fire, which momentarily has stopped a bloody hostility that has raged for 17 years, was in peril owing to certain "gray areas" in the agreement that took several hours of negotiations to clear up.

Guingona told the Cabinet that the gray areas were thrashed out to the satisfaction of both the NDF negotiators Satur Ocampo, Antonio Zumel, and Carolina Malay Ocampo, and the government side.

Guingona said among the points agreed upon were the following:

1. NDF forces who enter populated areas will not bring their firearms with them.
2. Those who carry firearms outside of populated areas will be identified with agreed identification credentials.
3. If there should be any chance meeting between the NDF and the AFP, both should refrain from hostile acts against each other.
4. The movement of 10 or more rebels who want to transfer locations should be approved beforehand by the ceasefire committee.
5. With regard to barrio fiestas, NDF forces who mingle with the crowd should be appropriately identified to avoid untoward clashes.

Guingona also said that NDF forces who wish to return to normal life are welcome and an economic recovery program has been prepared for them.

He also said that for the duration of the cease-fire, the government will treat wounded NPA soldiers.

Guingona said the cease-fire signals the beginning of a new era that will finally allow the government to focus on the urgent problems of the economy.

He said the government is now preparing to negotiate with the NDF on the substantive issues of the cease-fire agreement. This will start on Dec. 27.

Guingona will be assisted in the peace talks by Jaime Guerrero, chairman of the Export Processing Zone Authority, who took the place of Agriculture Minister Ramon Mitra Jr. who resigned earlier from the government panel.

Meantime, Guingona swore into office the vice-chairman and members of the National Ceasefire Committee. These were Augusto Almeda Lopez, vice-president of ABS-CBN [Chronicle Broadcasting Network], vice-chairman; dean Irene Cortes of the University of the Philippines, PC [Philippine Constabulary] chief Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, and Francisco Pascual of the NDF, members.

Chairman of the committee is Bishop Antonio Fortich of Bacolod, president of the National Social Action Arm of the Catholic Church. He is expected to arrive in Manila today to assume his duties.

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CSO: 4020/243

PHILIPPINES

CHRISTIANS FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION REJECT CONSTITUTION

HK090432 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 8 Dec 86 pp 1, 6

[Text] The clandestine Christians for National Liberation (CNL), an alliance affiliated with the National Democratic Front (NDF), has rejected the draft constitution. In a statement issued during its third National Congress last week, the CNL explained it could "not enshrine a reactionary document, simply because we want to give temporary stability to the regime" of President Aquino.

Thus far, no aboveground church organization has taken a similar stance.

The declaration, drafted at the same time the Catholic hierarchy pledged its support for the draft charter, underscores the consistency with the CNL has approached its politics, both inside and outside the church.

Organized in 1972, the CNL was driven underground during the Marcos years. It believes that Filipino Christians have a "special" contribution to make in what they call "the revolutionary movement for national freedom and democracy." This special role, the CNL points out in the main issue of its official publication, PILIPINAS, is the work "to realize the transformation of our institutional churches towards true service to God and people."

Aside from supporting sectoral struggles, the CNL endorses the New People's Army (NPA). In this light it expressed "grave concern" over the breakaway of Frs. Conrado Balweg and Bruno Ortega and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) from the NPA. The CNL said that while it respects the decision of the breakaway group, it is apprehensive that the moves are indicative of "an undisclosed surrender and a camouflaged subservience to the government and the new but (still) very fascist Armed Forces of the Philippines."

The CNL charged as the "demonic scheme" of ultra-rightists the adoption of the CPLA.

Although the CNL supports the Aquino presidency, it "will not go so far as supporting a Constitution that we know militates against the people's well-being and will entrench and give legitimacy to reactionary rule now and in the future."

The CNL also announced it would participate in the plebiscite, if only to warn the people of the "danger" of the draft "to their freedom, their patrimony, and their future development and well-being."

In the 75-line statement, the CNL insisted that "little justice is enshrined in the new Constitution. No new society will come out of it, only the re-establishment of the old patterns of economic, social and political relations, the old reactionary dominating power, and of continuing foreign imperialist control of Philippine life."

It asserted that the draft leaves the national economy and patrimony "completely open" to foreign domination, that the structure and form of government is re-defined in terms of an "effete" political system "that will only intensify the power of traditional reactionary forces."

Although the alliance noted the provisions on land reform and workers rights, the CNL said these were subject to "the vagaries of [word indistinct] exchanges" in a system "controlled by owners of land and other means of production."

The CNL described the February 1987 plebiscite as a "dubious political exercise" saying it will not be a plebiscite on the merits or demerits of the draft but a referendum on the Aquino presidency.

In another statement, the CNL noted the continuing red scare in the church, saying that some church leaders, wittingly or unwittingly, have allowed themselves to be used. The CNL said that only "reactionary church officials and people who fear the growth of people power" attack those who uphold the interests of the poor and the oppressed.

The CNL also condemned the murder of labor leader Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. It also expressed solidarity with the Nicaraguan people, joining the protest against the recent approval by the U.S. Congress of \$110 million in aid to the Contras.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

PKP NINTH CONGRESS RECEIVES INTERNATIONAL GREETINGS

CPSU Central Committee

LD292222 Moscow TASS in English 2151 GMT 29 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow, December 30 TASS--"The Philippine Communist Party, which bears high the banner of the defence of the interests of the working people of its country, consistently upholds the cause of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world, and which comes out against the aggressive policy of U.S. imperialism, for friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our two countries, is held in profound respect in the Soviet Union". This is said in the message of greetings of the CPSU Central Committee sent to the delegates to the Ninth Congress of the Philippine Communist Party.

The CPSU Central Committee stressed that the congress of the Philippine Communist Party is taking place in a complex international situation when the issue of war and peace has become the major problem of our time. "The CPSU holds that a solution to mankind's major problem of preserving peace on earth can be achieved now through the united efforts of all the peace forces which by their joint action can foil the ominous designs of the aggressive circles of imperialism".

"In the present-day international situation special responsibility for the destiny of peace and for the vital interests of the peoples rests with the communists. By its striving for the unity of left-wing, democratic and national-patriotic forces, the PCP makes a contribution to the consolidation of national independence and to the realization of the ideals of peace and social progress in accord with the aspirations of the Philippine people".

The CPSU Central Committee wishes the fraternal Philippine Communist Party further successes in its lofty efforts.

GDR's Honecker

East Berlin ADN International Service in English 30 Dec 86

[Text] Berlin, 30 Dec (ADN)--The SED Central Committee is convinced that an important impetus will emerge from the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines for the struggle of the workers of the Philippines for peace, democracy and social progress. This is stated in a greetings telegram signed by Erich Honecker.

The SED follows with great attention the resolute support of the Philippines Communists for peace and security in the world. The Communist Party of the Philippines opposes the dangers arising from imperialism for the country's political sovereignty and for peace and security in Asia and against all efforts by U.S. imperialism to militarize the Pacific region and to transform it into a theater of military-political confrontation. The efforts of the Philippine Communists for cooperation among all democratic forces in securing and strengthening democracy in the country and in the pursuit of social progress in the interests of the workers and of the entire people are being followed with sympathy.

Fraternal cooperation between the two parties has proven itself. The telegram expresses the conviction that internationalist relations between the two Marxist-Leninist parties will develop in the interests of the great common aims.

CSO: 4620/10
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PHILIPPINES

PKP SAYS CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT 'MOST LIKELY' TO COLLAPSE

HK110803 Manila THE MANILA EVENING POST in English 9 Dec 86 pp 1, 6

[Article by Rey Briones]

[Text] The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), the original communist group in the country, today said the 60-day ceasefire agreement, which is supposed to start at noon tomorrow, will most likely collapse.

"The attempts of both the government and the extreme left to end the 17-year-old armed conflict through a temporary ceasefire accord may not take off because the U.S. does not want a lasting peace in the country," Felicisimo Macapagal, PKP general secretary, said at University of the Philippines Youth Hostel, Diliman, Quezon City.

Macapagal said that "the interest of U.S. imperialism will not survive in countries where people are united behind a nationalist cause."

"The primary contradiction in Philippine society today is between the Filipino people and the imperialist forces," said the 72-year-old communist leader, who shared a seat with Jose Ma Sison in the PKP's Political Bureau in 1966.

Macapagal said "Historical patterns showed that the U.S. would always find ways to sabotage efforts of Filipino leaders to settle ideological conflicts."

He cited the pacification campaign of the late President Manuel Roxas in 1947 when thousands of PKP military men were slaughtered by suspected U.S. troopers in Central Luzon.

Macapagal added: "Experience taught us that the U.S. does not want a Filipino solution to the country's insurgency problem."

Macapagal said the PKP is not a part of the 60-day ceasefire accord between the government and the National Democratic Front (NDF), but stressed that the NDF-led Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is its revolutionary partner.

"The CPP has sprung from the Marxist-Lenin thoughts which the PKP adheres to, although Sison broke ranks with us in 1968 when he failed to convince

the Politburo that armed confrontation with the opposite force should be adopted as the last form of struggle to gain genuine national liberation," Macapagal said.

He added: "The PKP supports the peace efforts of the negotiators to bring peace and warns the leftist negotiators to adopt extra precautions in settling their armed conflict with the government at the negotiating table."

"While the truce is initially limited to 60 days, we hope the dialogue can demonstrate to our people the futility of the anticomunist campaign waged by reactionary elements," he said.

Asked why the extreme leftist rebels agreed to set aside armed confrontation with government troopers, Macapagal said: "Maybe, the CPP needs the 60-day truce for its tactical operations. Or it wants to show to the people that the CPP is not a killing-oriented movement."

The PKP chief stressed that the possible breaking points in the ceasefire negotiations are the issues on coalition government, dismantling of U.S. military bases, and the disarming of communist armies.

The PKP was founded in 1930 by then labor leader Crisanto Evangelista. It remained a legal political party until later that year when the U.S. Government declared it unlawful to engage in communistic activities.

Later, the PKP was accepted by the U.S. Government as a legal organization with the support of the U.S. Communist Party. Its legality lasted until World War II broke out in 1942.

After the war, the PKP was again declared an illegal organization.

Sison, who shared a seat in the PKP's Politburo with Macapagal, broke away from the group in 1968 and put up his own communist party, now the CPP.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

NDF GRAFFITI IN MANILA DENOUNCED BY ARMY, MAYORS

HK111309 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog 1000 GMT 11 Dec 86

[Text] Captain Anselmo Cabingan of the Armed Forces of the Philippines public information office reported that Metro Manila's mayors-officers-in-charge have criticized the National Democratic Front [NDF] for putting up propaganda materials on the walls and streets of Manila.

[Begin Cabingan recording in English] The denunciation was made during the briefing of the Metro Manila Mayors on the current cease-fire situation by the New Armed Forces of the Philippines at the GHQ [General Headquarters] conference hall at Camp Aguinaldo last night. Most affected by the graffiti written on the walls were the main thoroughfares of the metropolis at Taft Avenue, Quirino Avenue, Magsaysay in Santa Mesa and EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) in Quezon City.

According to the mayors, while propaganda is not a hostile act and not a violation of the cease-fire agreement, graffiti is a violation of local ordinances and may be considered as vandalism and abuse of the freedom of expression as contemplated in the [words indistinct] of society.

The conference was opened by Brigadier General Luis San Andres, deputy chief of staff for civil military operations of J-7. The briefing on the current psychological situation was given by Colonel Victor Orgullo, assistant chief of staff for intelligence of the Civil Relations Service [CRS]. Colonel Honest Isleta, CRS chief, talked on the cease-fire, the NDF strategies and the roles of local officials, while Metro Manila Governor Jose D. Lina gave the closing remarks.

According to the mayors at the briefing, it would cost the local government and private owners of those walls defaced by the propaganda a sizable amount of public and private money to clean up the mess and the damage done by the CPP [Communist Party of the Philippines]-NPA-NDF vandals. This uncivilized act does not reflect well on the perpetrators of the graffiti [words indistinct] if not in the distant future. [end recording]

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

REBEL PRIEST CLAIMS NPA, CPLA REMAIN ALLIES

HK151439 Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 15 Dec 86 p 36

[Text] Baguio City--Rebel priest Conrado Balweg has denied reports that members of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA) which he heads had reinforced government troops in a recent encounter against the New People's Army (NPA) in Abra.

Asking newsmen to be factual in their reportage, Balweg, in a press conference here Saturday, also took exception to an alleged interview made in Mountain Province wherein he reportedly said he wanted the NPA to stay away from problems in the Cordillera.

"This is very destructive," Balweg pointed out.

"Awan ti kinaagpayso na dayta a report," (there is no truth to that report), "Ka Moro [comrade]", another CPLA member said of the alleged participation of the CPLA in the reported government troops' encounter with NPA forces in Abra.

"Ka Moro" said the CPLA members were in San Ramon, Abra, when the alleged encounter took place in another area.

"In fact," he said, the photo of Ambo (nickname of Balweg among CPLA members) as published in the paper was taken in 1985 in Balweg, Mountain Province not in Abra."

Balweg, who earlier this year broke away from the NPA to form the CPLA, said the role of CPLA is "to give maximum moral support to the political struggle for self-determination of the Cordilleras."

"The moral basis of the CPLA is rooted in the defense of the Cordillera homeland," Balweg said, adding that his group welcomes the support of any group, even from the NPA or the NAFF in the struggle for self-determination.

He said that his group had held two meetings with the NPAs during which "we agreed to remain allies as they (NPA) claim they will support the self-determination struggle of the people of the Cordillera."

Following the signing of a truce between the CPLA and the government last Sept. 13, Balweg said "in practice, the relationship of the CPLA and the New Armed Forces of the Philippines (NAFP) is very rational, not emotional."

"In the process, the CPLA is already being accused of being a new CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Force) or tool of the military, Balweg said.

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CSO: 4200/243

COLUMNIST CLAIMS GOVERNMENT 'OUTMANEUVERED' BY REBELS

HK121315 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 12 Dec 86 p 4

["Here and Now" column by Francisco S. Tatad: "What Does It All Mean?"]

[Text] Although the last rumor of a military coup has rumbled off, life in the Aquino presidency has not become less intense. The President has to have the proposed new Constitution ratified, and at the same time, produce satisfactory results from the peace talks with the National Democratic Front [NDF]. Each of these requires full concentration and effort--she should not have simultaneously tackled both. That, however, is now academic.

Understandably, Mrs. Aquino wants and needs to succeed in both. But because she is quite embattled, she needs to be sure of her step. She cannot possibly be expected to give both undertakings her best time and effort; one priority must yield to the other--she cannot have two home runs at the same time. The NDF knows this, and is counting on it.

But this requires a sense of planning, and no one can accuse the President of planning her most important initiatives in depth. Her miraculous ascent to the presidency appears to have taught her to trust in intuition and instinct. Thus, she has created herself a situation in which she is compelled to watch the NDF use the present peace talks to every political advantage while she worries about the possible outcome of next February's constitutional plebiscite.

Should she perhaps subordinate the plebiscite to the peace talks? Perhaps she should. But she must realize by now that her actions against the 1973 Constitution and the institutions under it have so destabilized her government and she must be quite desperate to get out of that fix. She obviously believes that a new Constitution is the key to the country's stability, even though it is now clear that the two most serious challenges she faces--the NDF demand for a coalition government, and the Moro National Liberation Front's declaration of a provisional government in Mindanao--will not go away after the plebiscite.

She needs to adjust her priorities. She needs to ask herself whether in her haste to undo her constitutional mistake while simultaneously negotiating

with the communists, she has not, in fact, seriously jeopardized the nation's capacity to effectively deal with both the constitutional crisis and the peace process. It does appear that because she wants to win the plebiscite, she has allowed the communists to use their alleged support of her presidency to procure undue advantages over the government, instead of using her political capital to procure advantages for the state in dealing with the communists. And while they exploit every possible advantage, she seems to be more worried about the constitutionalization of her revolutionary government.

Many things have gone wrong and are wrong in this government. And many of them are unperceived. Having sacked Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, for instance, the President seems to have led herself to believe that she had rid herself of the problem, when in fact, she had merely gotten rid of the most obvious symptom of the problem, or one who called attention to the problem. The problem remains.

For as long as Enrile was there, he provided the anti-communist cause in the political leadership that the presidency could not provide. He spoke with conviction about a threat which the presidency had chosen to be completely silent about. He naturally intimidated and correspondingly incurred the hatred of the left. And upon his departure from the Cabinet the political leadership lapsed into a deep and total silence about the communist threat.

Now the prospect of the government being completely outflanked and outwitted by the NDF cannot be exaggerated. All the signs point to it. The strongest propaganda message that has enveloped the country is the NDF message, not that of the government. It is Tony Zumel, Satur Ocampo and Bobbie Malay, not Mrs. Aquino, Gen. Ramos, Minister Ileto and the rest of the Cabinet, whose words are attracting running analyses and grabbing the masses. And just to show you what weight the words of the government carry, thousands marched under the hammer and sickle red flag in Samar a couple of days after Ileto had said that no strange flags shall be allowed to fly under Philippine skies.

The desperate effort on the eve of the ceasefire to iron out some controversial provisions of the preliminary ceasefire agreement indicates that there had been no real meeting of minds on the correct interpretation of the agreement before it was signed in haste. It has also become clear that the NDF concedes nothing at all to the government.

The communists are allowed to bear arms even during the talks. The government may engage in peacekeeping against criminality, but it may not touch "political crimes." such as sedition, subversion, the takeover of government offices and buildings, through "people power", etc. What is the meaning of all this?

It means that the government has been badly outmaneuvered. Now the NDF is in Manila, and has become a real force even in the daily conduct of government. The tragedy is that very few seem to realize what it means.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

MINDANAO CHRISTIANS 'DISENCHANTED' WITH GOVERNMENT

HK121111 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 12 Dec 86 p 5

["Reflections" column by Manuel F. Almario: "The Mindanao Situation"]

[Text] What has worsened the Mindanao situation is not the return of Nur Misuari, the leader of the Muslim National Liberation Front, as some observers have stressed, but the growing disenchantment of its Christian population.

Because of long decades of neglect by the central government, and its glaring inability in recent times to maintain peace and achieve progress in the region, many Christian residents of Mindanao are joining the secessionist groups. It is an expression of despair, an act of desperation.

The Christian secessionist movement is at present being led by the Mindanao Independence Movement [MIM] headed by Reuben Canoy, a man with a checkered career, former newspaper columnist, deputy minister of information during the early days of the Marcos dictatorship, former mayor of Cagayan de Oro City and suspected nuisance candidate for president in the February snap election.

The MIM and the more aggressive MNLF have already filed petitions with the United Nations for the recognition of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan as a separate state. The MNLF has gone farther. It reportedly has declared a provisional government for the region and raised the MNLF flags in various cities, particularly Jolo, drawing a warning from Gen. Fidel Ramos, armed forces chief of staff.

The situation in Mindanao is explosive and may erupt into another bloodbath that could equal, if not exceed, the early months of the Marcos martial law regime when tens of thousands of Filipino Muslims were killed and wounded, and entire villages razed. The conflict had even incited charges of genocide against the Marcos government.

The situation could become very critical if the moderate Christian leaders and politicians of Mindanao, most of whom are represented in the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan Association (Minsupala), would openly side with the secessionists. The prevailing sentiment according to former Surigao del Sur Governor Rolando Geotina, a prominent member of the group, is already for secession, although no formal break away has been announced.

The government should act decisively and judiciously on this matter. It can start, as Minsupala has proposed, with the creation of a Mindanao Commission composed of respected and knowledgeable citizens to comprehensively study the Mindanao problem, trace its historical roots, pinpoint the present specific grievances and anxieties of its residents, ascertain the concrete viewpoints of the disparate and contending political and religious factions in the region, synthesize and reconcile the different viewpoints, recommend solutions and present the study to our policy making [word indistinct] nation so that positive and lasting solutions could be applied immediately.

As it is now, the average Filipino has but a general knowledge of what is happening in Mindanao, the issues that are tearing it apart, and the possible solutions that could restore peace and bring prosperity to that once sedate and potentially rich region. The Mindanao Commission, as Geotina proposed, could perform this task.

It is my feeling that what Mindanao needs most of all is justice--an equal and firm respect for its religion, culture and traditions, a fair and equal share of the benefits from its economic and natural resources, genuine political autonomy and the removal of the twin shackles of neo-colonialism and exploitation imposed on it by the multinations and their local compradors and counterparts.

In a sense, the tinderbox situation in Mindanao poses a more serious threat to our sovereignty than the challenge posed by the National Democratic Front. At least, the NDF, to our knowledge, desires the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Republic, although it favors genuine autonomy for the Muslim populations and other ethnic and cultural groups. On this matter, both our government and the NDF are nominally in agreement.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL STRESSES NEED TO REHABILITATE SOCIETY

HK121503 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 12 Dec 86 p 9

[Editorial: "Society, Not Rebels, Needs Rehab"]

[Text] The Government has made a valid start by appropriating P1 billion for the rehabilitation of rebel returnees. We understand that the Government also intends to assure all returnees jobs and land they can own. The latter, we hope, will spell the beginning of a more universal implementation of genuine land reform.

There seems to be something amiss, however, in the presumption that underlies the rehabilitation program. It assumes that those returning rebels took a position against the Government and the Establishment out of deprivation. This presumption may be correct for some rebels who, rather than turning to criminal acts as did many of their less fortunate countrymen, preferred to honor their human dignity by joining a group intent on changing the structures of society that make the compulsion to commit crimes inevitable.

Still, some of the rebels, as the NDF [National Democratic Front] panel would suggest, did not join the cause of the underground on account of joblessness or deprivation. As everybody now knows, Tony Zumel was enjoying a fairly well-paying job as a journalist. So was Satur Ocampo. Bobbie Malay could have been a professor of French or literature in her alma mater, the University of the Philippines.

The same holds true of so many others who joined the underground, among them priests or members of religious orders who had vowed, when they followed their vocation, poverty and worldly discipline. Then there were business executives like Alan Jazmines and landed intellectuals like Jose Ma. Sison. Going beyond the NDF, we find a similar situation: Nur Misuari of the MNLF could have continued being a professor in the University of the Philippines.

Indeed, a number of those who joined the underground, either with those organizations affiliated with the NDF or the other rebel groups such as the MNLF or the Cordillera Alliance, come from social classes that shared in the monopoly of the very privileges they now intend to distribute more equitably.

We do not doubt the sincerity of the Aquino Government in wanting to make amends for the injustice done by its predecessor. But if the rehabilitation program is meant to be some kind of carrot--to dangle to the rebels in exchange for their acceptance of the status quo--then we submit that the viewpoint seems rather morally retrograde and that Government does not seem to have come to an understanding of the root cause of the rebellion it has magnificently succeeded in quelling, for the time being.

We suggest that a better deal for the rebels is within the hands of Government already--that is, the pursuit of its reformist commitments. This means addressing the very structures that justify rebellion and validate the movement for change.

In this regard, we do not expect the Government to come up with a perfect society even within the term of President Aquino. But Mrs. Aquino and her Government could do much by starting the process and ensuring that succeeding administrations will not be able to reverse the logic of the social trend it would have begun. To do so would be to turn back the clock or to invite the ire of the people.

This is why, with the difficulties conceded, we are hopeful that the more substantive phase of the cease-fire talks will not be impossible to achieve. For going by the published agenda of the NDF, we do not see a large gap between their aspirations and the promises associated with the Aquino Government.

Society, not the rebels, needs the rehabilitation.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

EDITORIAL LAUDS GOVERNMENT, NDF EFFORTS ON TRUCE

HK160401 Manila THE MANILA TIMES in English 15 Dec 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Government-NDF Joint Statement Bolsters Peace"]

[Text] We congratulate the government negotiating panel and its National Democratic Front [NDF] counterpart for their joint statement upholding the ceasefire agreement despite minor infractions of the existing truce. It is one thing to call attention to a violation of the ceasefire. It is another to use it as an excuse for scrapping the agreement.

There will be isolated violations by irresponsible elements in both camps but as long as they do not reflect the official stand of the organizations, both camps should regard them as infractions by individual recalcitrants found in both army and rebel troops. At a later stage, they may agree on what disciplinary action can be taken on recalcitrants of both groups.

The army claims that the NDF violated the truce agreement when 70 armed "dissidents" marched down Samal's main street armed with high-powered guns. The NDF says that they did not violate the truce because Samal is not a populated area. We don't know what agreement the government and the NDFs will finally reach as to what constitutes a "populated area." From our view, the questions are: Was the show of force necessary? What did the NDF gain by it? Were the NDFs armed to protect themselves or protect the people of Samal? Why parade the Gospel of Force? People are repulsed by militarism whether it is displayed by government or by partisan troops. Militarism is a fighting mental attitude that does not recognize an end to hostilities.

The parade was supposed to celebrate the success of the ceasefire agreement. Why celebrate a peace agreement with a display of military strength?

There will be more incidents of this kind. There will be armed conflicts in some areas. These must not disrupt the talks. The Samal and Agdao incidents are not representative of the national efforts towards peace. Peace is an arduous task. The Agdao incident should be thoroughly investigated. Guilty parties should be punished.

Again we congratulate both negotiating panels for all the efforts they are exerting for peace. Both sides have been throwing light--not heat--on the problems.

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CSO: 4200/243

TATAD ON NDF'S PROPAGANDA SUCCESS

HK160233 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 15 Dec 86 p 4

["Here and Now" column by Francisco S. Tatad: "Explaining the NDF Success"]

[Text] It has been, thus far, a one-way street for the NDF [National Democratic Front]. This is not at all fair to the government. But that's how it is.

In July, the National Democratic Front saw itself as many times militarily inferior to the government, and feared political isolation if it reacted wrongly to President Aquino's ceasefire initiative. Today it has converted its military weakness into political strength.

The assessment of the national urban and united front committees then was that the people's war had not gone past the stage of strategic defensive. How to intensify guerrilla and regular warfare was its concern in order to hasten a military stalemate. The emergence of a popular president on the crest of a nonviolent protest dictated a more creative and audacious approach to the task of "winning the people's hearts and minds."

Because it had originally boycotted the presidential elections and its leaders had not been seen on EDSA [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] during the civilian-backed military revolt, the NDF decided that only a correct handling of the ceasefire could negate the effects of its boycott, which its enemies had begun to take advantage of. It was felt that through its handling of the ceasefire, it should be able to show the majority of the people that it "can provide the correct political leadership."

Accordingly, it decided that there should be an intensification of its intelligence and research work, and that its negotiators be equipped with Marxist theory on ceasefire negotiations." They should apply the relevant lessons of China, Vietnam, El Salvador, Colombia, and others, and the terms of the ceasefire must consider both tactical and strategic goals.

It was also decided that propaganda work be given full play. A well-staffed propaganda committee must embark upon an organized and extensive propaganda

offensive before, during and after the ceasefire negotiations. The ceasefire must itself try to isolate the hawks at the military and defense establishment, the pro-Marcos loyalists, and all other conservative elements. The talks should be prolonged.

It was also decided that in entering into any agreement, certain minimum requirements should be met. These include no laying down of arms, no disbandment of guerrilla formations, no encampment of its forces or limitation of maneuverability, no temporary integration or joint commands with the Armed Forces, withdrawal of regular government troops from battle areas; a significant role for the NDF in formulating and implementing the socio-economic program of government; and respect for the rights of all people's organization.

Without conceding anything to the government, the NDF got everything it wanted. This has confirmed its enormous propaganda skills, and exposed the government's lack of competence.

Can the situation be reversed?

One must continue to work for it. But this requires a lot of imagination and daring on the part of the President. This is a propaganda war and the government is on the receiving end. The NDF mass line is correct and clear, while the government has none up to this point.

Mrs. Aquino must now find the courage to tell the nation that her government, rather than the NDF, has the correct solutions to the problems of the masses. She should be able to show that the state can deal effectively with these problems without resorting to violence.

Land reform is the first of these. Social justice requires it. Land reform alone will not completely solve the insurgency, but without it, no solution to the problem can be contemplated.

If Mrs. Aquino has the power to abolish an existing Constitution and parliament, replace elected government officials, and do away with the security of tenure of civil service eligibles, then she has the power to decree a meaningful land reform that directly and adequately addresses the problems of poverty, productivity, and insurgency.

Not only has she not done this. She also refuses to do it. Is it possible she may not completely believe in it? It has been suggested that she start land reform right in Hacienda Luisita, her family's sugar estate in Tarlac. What an impact that would have! But her own minister of agrarian reform has told the press in the presence of NDF leaders Antonio Zumel, Satur Ocampo, and Carolina Malay, that Mrs. Aquino is only one of several brothers and sisters and that she cannot possibly decide for all her relatives.

It's an incredible statement. The President herself likes to say that the proposed new Constitution, if ratified, will allow Congress to enact the

land reform program needed. This sounds a good way out. But obviously she has not read the appropriate provision, otherwise she would not be saying that. The provision is one which seems to have been constructed in such a way as to make sure that unless a Congress of landless peasants were elected, no land reform would ever be carried out.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

COLUMNIST WARNS AGAINST DESTABILIZATION BY RADIO

HK042354 Manila PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER in English 4 Dec 86 p 5

[*"Political Tidbits"* column by Belinda Olivares-Cunanan: "Radio as Agent of Destabilization"]

[Text] When the president visited the depressed province of Negros in mid-October, she was told by a Negrense during the sectoral dialogue about the continued domination of the radio broadcast industry in that region by the faction of a Negros KBL warlord. The president was informed that her government is the object of a constant vilification campaign in the airwaves, which completely distorts its aims and programs and contributes to further destabilization there.

The president was thus apprised, perhaps for the first time, of a situation where the radio broadcast industry has remained largely in the control of key henchmen of the Marcos dictatorship. From reports gathered by this column, it appears that the Negros situation is reflected in other parts of the country as well.

In fact, just recently an INQUIRER reader from Cebu, R. Philip Inez, wrote to denounce the "name-calling smear campaign" against certain Aquino Cabinet ministers over Cebu station DYLA. He said a group of broadcasters has kept a regular attack on the ministers allegedly for their "communist" leanings, but without substantiating their remarks. Reader Inez also points out that the same group portrays a vote for the constitution as a sure vote for communism, "wreaking havoc on the efforts of sincere quarters in media who have tried their best to provide a dispassionate and objective analysis of the issues in the coming plebiscite."

The questions citizens are asking are, what is the government doing about the situation in radio? How far should the freedom of expression be invoked? Aren't there guidelines for the responsible use of freedom of speech and of expression? While opposition is healthy in a democracy, isn't government mistaking permissiveness for freedom of expression? If gross distortions, crude vulgarities, outright libel, and even sedition are openly being committed in the airwaves should not the State protect itself? What steps ought to be taken by the Ministry of Justice to handle these violations? What

steps should the Ministry of Transportation and Communication take to regulate the use of radio, specifically in the matter of franchises?

Not a few citizens have brought this matter of a licentious and even seditious use of radio to various columnists. Unlike the print medium, which stays more permanently with printed "evidence" on hand, more distortions, libel and sedition are being committed in the airwaves; unfortunately, however, government seems too busy to pay attention to them. But citizens continually point to the insidious harm being done to the stability of the country, not to mention the warping of minds, particularly of the more impressionable. Clearly the thinking of many citizens is that government is losing the propaganda war on the radio front.

There are over 300 radio stations in the country today, of which over 50 are concentrated in the Metro Manila area alone. The irony is that many of these radio stations have been sequestered by the government because they had belonged to a number of Marcos cronies, some of whom included the most notorious warlords of the Marcos era. Yet some of these sequestered radio stations are now among the most vicious in their distortions, and this owes largely to the present administration's new atmosphere of freedom and respect for free expression--and its lamentable neglect of this most potent communication tool.

But one source of anomaly in radio today is the fact that the industry is extremely overcrowded; in fact, the parallelism between the radio and print media situation is inescapable. One detrimental result of overcrowding is that the stations tend to get the more sensationalizing broadcaster who invariably attack the government, instead of trying to maintain balance in their programs. It also causes a lot of the graft and corruption among certain radio practitioners.

One unhealthy practice in radio is to sell what is called "block-time" to anyone who could put up the money. At times unscrupulous broadcasters, funded by some politicos, buy block-time in order to attack politicians and government officials and then use it to extort money.

Clearly there is tremendous need, not only to police and regulate broadcasting, but to rationalize the radio industry as well. But from reports, we gather that the mandated government agency, the Ministry of Transportation and Communication, is not doing its job, as it appears to be caught up in intramurals. Meanwhile, certain radio announcers whose credibility is so low--one of them has been charged with rape and another with kidnaping--continue to have a field day molding the guileless Filipino mind.

We understand that the government-owned Bureau Broadcaster operates some 30 radio stations throughout the country. A radio critic noted, however, that many of these stations are quite weak in transmitting power and are therefore extremely limited in scope, compared to some of the anti-government

stations. In addition, much of the programming is said to be lackluster and seemingly without direction. This critic would recommend that the government close most of these stations and concentrate only on a few really powerful stations, and put up programs that would highlight the more positive achievements of government and the private sector. In view of the tireless efforts of the Marcos wrecking crew, there is a critical need for such programs.

Then too, citizens should be ever-vigilant about excesses and abuses in radio and be ready to protest them with mass actions. There is a sore need for citizens' vigilante committees to monitor the radio programs in the various regions. One specific action that such committees could do would be to pressure advertisers to withdraw their support from abusive, vulgar and distorted programs, under pain of a citizens' boycott.

More than any other media, radio continues to be the most potent tool for communicating with the citizens at the grassroots level, as it penetrates to the littlest barrio. But the Aquino administration apparently still has to wake up to radio's power and how to project its programs effectively on this medium, as a way of stabilizing the political and economic situation.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

CHRONICLE URGES REPEAL OF ANTISUBVERSION LAW

HK160255 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 15 Dec 86 p 9

[Editorial: "Sunday Reflections--Urgency of Extending Democratic Rights to Rebels"]

[Text] Our reflections this Sunday dwell on lofty thoughts that provide a spiritual perspective to the current ceasefire. The subject is ever fresh even if this is our seventh editorial on it.

Former Senator Raul S. Manglapus, president of the underground Movement for a Free Philippines during the Marcos dictatorship and now president of the newly formed National Union of Christian Democrats, is the latest prominent political figure to endorse our stand that the restoration of the political and human rights of Filipino communists should precede any search for total peace, including ceasefire and truce and amnesty talks for the peace efforts to succeed.

We believe such restoration can be brought about by the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law (R.A. 1700) which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and related organizations.

Lifting of the ban would automatically shear off the fetters that make the communists second-class citizens in their own homeland.

The repeal creates a new happy scenario--the communists regain the full stature as Filipino citizens who are free to move around as citizens, who can participate in elections. They are then supposed to obey the laws and subject to arrest and prosecution when they violate such laws. These crimes could include rebellion and possession of unlicensed firearms. No more need for ceasefire and peace talks. No need for hiding in the hills. No need for Filipinos killing Filipinos. Everybody is equal in the eyes of the law.

The late rationale from Malacanang is that Cory fears the communists won't surrender their firearms once their party is legalized.

These fears are baseless. If the new full-fledged citizens carry or hoard unlicensed firearms in violation of law, they can be prosecuted and punished like anyone else. What amazes us is the hesitation of the President to exercise her legislative prerogative to issue constructive decrees and repeal evil laws.

If she is leaving the final say to the First Congress next year, we would have lost much time and the opportunity for our communist countrymen to take part in the February 2 plebiscite and the May 11 elections.

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CSO: 4200/243

MONEY RESERVES SHOOT UP AS BANKS CASH CB BILLS

HK041532 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 4 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by reporter Daniel C. Yu]

[Text] Banks have begun cashing a large amount of the high-yield Central Bank [CB] bills which the CB had issued in past years to siphon off "excess money" in the economy.

The financial market, already bugged by overliquidity, has found itself with still more funds.

The reserve money, consisting of deposit balances of banks and currency in circulation, shot up by P2.9 billion in one week, from Nov. 10 to 14, despite stepped-up efforts by the government to auction off Treasury bills.

CB data made available to BUSINESS DAY showed that reserve money level during the period reached P43,840 million compared to P40,938 million during the week of Nov. 3 to 7 and P39,662 million Oct. 6-10.

The sudden sharp rise during the second week of November was the first since the government signed a standby credit program with the International Monetary Fund.

It narrowed substantially to P1.16 billion the gap between the actual level and the limit of P45 billion for end-1986 reserve money agreed between the government and the IMF.

A large portion of the increase in reserve money has been traced to CB bills which have had to be redeemed because the CB is no longer allowed to issue bills to match such redemptions.

Sources in the CB said monetary authorities are aware of the bunching up of maturities of these government securities but appeared unable to control its impact on overall money supply.

One measure, the weekly sale of Treasury bills, can only absorb P4 billion of the money flowing back to the financial system from the CB during the last several weeks.

The CB's government securities department has agreed with investors and accredited government securities dealers that it cannot increase the total offering of Treasury bills unless it announces one ahead of time.

The sixth auction of Treasury bills held last week was oversubscribed as were all the previous others. Tenders for P4 billion worth of bills offered reached P23.377 billion.

Another liquidity-control measure, the overnight repurchase agreement in which the CB borrows from commercial banks, has had minimal impact on the outstanding level of money in the financial system as banks themselves are awash with cash.

CB sources said that the monetary [words indistinct] authorities are also aware that with the sudden rise in the reserve money during the second week of November, the CB would have to adopt measures to prevent overshooting the agreed ceiling with the IMF.

The rise in money supply at a time when most banks are full of idle funds is likely to put even more downward pressure on interest rates.

With an expansionary monetary policy that includes a recent lowering of the reserve requirement on bank deposits, more funds are being released into the financial market when there is a dearth in loan demand and continued selectivity of banks in granting loans.

Idle funds have already started to pile up, forcing fund managers to look for safe outlets.

One outlet is the Treasury bills but their offering has been limited and banks compete fiercely for the P4 billion offered weekly.

Another possible outlet, although remote at the moment, is the foreign exchange market. It has been empirically proven that in times of such excess funds banks eventually speculate on foreign exchange.

This is not the case yet, but some bankers fear that unless demand for loans picks up in the near term the cash in bank vaults might be found again flowing into the purchase of dollars.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

CONSULTANCY FIRM SEES NEGATIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH

HK150615 Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0330
GMT 15 Dec 86

[Text] The Philippines economy may suffer another negative growth rate this year but is expected to post a 2 to 3 percent growth in gross national product next year, the Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Limited said in its latest quarterly country risk survey of the Philippines. The consultancy's projections were lower than the government's own forecast of at least a 0.5 to 1 percent GNP growth rate this year and a GNP growth rate of at least 6 percent next year.

The survey said that the last quarter of this year should provide some favorable indications if economic growth is to be achieved next year. It said that will take a great leap to move the economy into positive growth in the last quarter of 1986 and to sustain the momentum into 1987. It predicted a 21 peso to \$1 exchange rate at the end of this month.

While noting slight improvements in domestic economic conditions, it said that the bright spots in the economy were far and few. It added that while opportunities abound, local and foreign industrialists have been withholding risk capital for investment purposes. Without ample investments, it will be difficult for agriculture and industry to create substantial productive gains, employment, and [word indistinct].

The Hong Kong consultancy firm also said that political risks remain high, even as President Aquino is making progress at consolidating her position.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

COCONUT EXPORT INCOME INCREASES 2.9 PERCENT

HK110221 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 10 Dec 86 p 3

[Text] Foreign exchange earned on exports of coconut products from January to November inched up 2.9 percent from \$496 million in the corresponding 1985 period to \$510.8 million despite a 100.3 percent increase in volume from 1.076 million metric tons to 2.156 million, according to preliminary figures from the Philippine Coconut Authority.

Low prices of most coconut products, including coconut oil, desiccated coconut, coconut shell charcoal and activated carbon, limited the increase in export earnings, the PCA data showed.

Accounting for 53.01 percent of the total volume, coconut oil had a closing price of 9.86 cents per pound, down 42.6 percent from a year-ago closing price of 17.17 cents a pound.

As a result, dollar earnings on coconut oil shrank 1.5 percent from \$316 million to \$311.4 million despite a 104.7 percent increase in volume to 1,142,622 metric tons from 558,101.

Of all the coconut products, only copra cake/meal registered a price increase, of about 14.1 percent to \$100.75 per metric ton from \$88.32. It was the second biggest dollar earner among coconut products, with \$66.37 million, up 120.4 percent from \$30.12 million in the January-November period last year.

Copra cake/meal export volume increased 94.7 percent to 744,749 metric tons from 382,431.

Exports of Coconut Products

Volume (Metric tons)	January-November		% Increase (Decrease)
	1986	1985	
Copra	118,428.36	-	-
Coconut Oil	1,142,622.52	558,101.79	104.7
Desiccated Coconut	60,673.20	55,808.56	8.7
Copra Cake/Meal	744,749.00	382,431.00	94.7
Coco Shell Charcoal	24,989.97	30,607.71	(18.4)

	January-November 1986	1985	% Increase (Decrease)
Activate Carbon	11,017.18	10,729.82	2.7
Others	76,605.82	61,788.31	24.0
Total (copra terms)	2,156,421.36	1,076,539.00	100.0
Value (US\$ FOB)			
Copra	15,472,685.07	-	-
Coconut Oil	311,390,202.76	316,045,614.58	(1.5)
Desiccated Coconut	39,995,219.71	67,607,316.75	(40.8)
Copra Cake/Meal	66,373,179.03	30,117,435.76	12.6
Coco Shell Sharcoal	3,767,305.15	6,002,734.37	(37.2)
Activated Carbon	11,145,630.41	12,174,846.82	(8.4)
Others	62,661,165.72	64,352,477.72	(2.6)
Total	510,805,387.85	496,300,426.00	2.9

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

JAN-OCT WHEAT FLOUR IMPORTS HIGHEST SINCE 1981

HK111319 Quezon City BUSINESS DAY in English 11 Dec 86 p 3

[Text] Wheat flour imports from January to October increased about five-fold to 120,116 metric tons from 25,366 tons for the whole of last year and were the highest in volume and value since 1981, according to Central Bank [CB] statistics.

Freight-on-board value of imports up to October was recorded at P378.46 million compared to P96.43 million last year, P26.84 million for 5,767 tons in 1984, P19.92 million for 6,895 tons in 1983, P21.94 million for 9,850 tons in 1982, and P16.56 million for 8,234 tons in 1981.

The imports were equivalent to 30 percent of local flour production, 30 percent in the first three quarters as against only 5 percent in the whole of 1985.

The CB said flour imports up to September were 4,804,640 25-kilo bags compared to 1,014,640 bags last year.

On the other hand, the eight local flour mills recorded a combined production of 16,405,230 bags in the first nine months of the year as against 21,393,628 bags for the whole of 1985.

The rise in imports may be attributed to the dismantling last year of the National Food Authority's [NFA] monopoly over wheat imports and flour distribution.

The NFA gave up wheat importation in May 1985 and flour distribution in the following June in line with a government policy to encourage free enterprise.

Wheat grain importation by the mills up from last January to September amounted to 878,248 metric tons compared to 679,266 tons last year. Previous figures were: 792,575 tons in 1984; 881,120 tons in 1983; 917,684 tons in 1982; and 835,099 tons in 1981.

The mills recorded a total sales of 17,616,391 bags of flour in the first nine months of the year, as against 21,988,028 bags in 1985.

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CSO: 4200/243

PHILIPPINES

BRIEFS

EX-MP MINDANO INDEPENDENCE LINKS--Former MP Homobono Adaza yesterday denied alleged attempts by him to file a petition with the United Nations seeking the secession of Mindanao from the Republic. In a brief statement signed by his brother, Atty. Reino Adaza, the ex-assemblyman said published stories linking him to the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) were a "big lie." "I cannot be associated with any activities that has to do with the fragmentation of the Republic," Adaza said. Atty. Adaza said his brother had gone to Europe on a pleasure and business trip and had made the denial in an overseas call. Adaza also said he had nothing to do with Reuben Canoy, another former assemblyman who was allegedly behind the MIM, or any plan to establish embassies abroad for the secession bid. The United Nations had on Friday said it had not received any petition from Adaza or from any group advocating the secession of Mindanao. It also said it would ignore any such move because petitions of such nature are considered only when member-state files the case. [Text] [Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 14 Dec 86 p 4 HK] /6662

PCGG RETURNS PESOS TO GOVERNMENT--The national Treasury gained yesterday P731 million from firms sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and from operations of the casino for the first 10 months of the year. The PCGG turned over to the Treasury through the Office of the President P424.5 million in uncontested dividends, shares of stocks sold, and compromise payments of various firms it had sequestered. Aside from this, the PCGG also submitted P307.5 million to the Treasury, which is the National Government's share in the casino funds for January to October, 1986. This amount the PCGG noted, is much bigger than the P260 million share the past government received from the casino funds for 1985. Last month, the PCGG also cited that from its operations, it had turned over directly to the Treasury the amount of P192.2 million which consisted of P23.9 million contested receipts, P100 million in guaranty deposits (now considered as Trust liability of the National Government), and P68.3 million uncontested amount which is now part of the Government's income. [Text] [Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 11 Dec 86 p 3 HK] /6662

EXTENSION ON TRADE FACILITY--The 12-bank advisory committee representing the country's 483 foreign creditor banks has agreed to extend the \$3 billion trade facility due to expire at the end of the year for 6 months. The Central Bank announced that the advisory committee, at its request, agreed to provide for a 90-day standstill on the payment of the principal debts, which will be the subject of restructuring proposal for the Philippines. The creditor banks have also agreed to consider a request of the Philippine Government for a retroactive pricing on all credits which will be the subject of the new restructuring package to take effect by January next year. The Central Bank said the request has been endorsed by the advisory committee, with the understanding that both the committee and the Philippine Government will resume negotiations as soon as possible, and [word indistinct] the Philippine Government will work diligently toward reaching an agreement by April 1, 1987. [Text] [Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 12 Dec 86 HK] /6662

ECONOMIC GAINS IN THIRD QUARTER--Economic development in the third quarter of the year continues to show marked gains in key areas. This was according to Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez in his third-quarter report to President Aquino. Fernandez said the country has continued to attain discernable gains in its efforts to stabilize domestic prices, interest rates, and exchange rates. He said that developments during the third quarter appear to have reinforced the positive strength observed toward the end of the second quarter. [Text] [Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0400 GMT 14 Dec 86 HK] /6662

'NO COMPROMISE' WITH CREDITORS--There should be no compromise with the country's creditor banks if the government's bargaining position in the debt restructuring negotiations with the banks is reasonable in the first place, Economic Planning Minister Solita Monsod said. She gave the statement when asked by reporters on the possibility of a compromise settlement between the government and the advisory committee of the country's creditor banks on the restructuring of Philippine debts falling due in 1987 to 1991. Foreign bankers earlier said a willingness on the part of the government and the advisory committee to compromise their respective bargaining positions would pave the way for the resumption of negotiations between the two groups, which were suspended early last month over disagreement on the terms and pricing of the restructuring. [Text] [Baguio City Mountain Province Broadcasting Company in English 0330 GMT 15 Dec 86 HK] /6662

PALAWAN OPPOSES SECESSIONIST MOVE--[By Owen Masaganda] Puerto Princesa City-- The people of Palawan are against the inclusion of their province in the proposed separation of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan (Minsupala) from the Republic of the Philippines. Former natural resources minister Teodoro Q. Pena told the BULLETIN yesterday that the people have already rejected the inclusion of Palawan to Minsupala in the 1983 plebiscite. Muslims in Palawan are a small minority, about only 6 percent, and are presently residing in south Palawan, Pena said. The majority of Palawan residents came from Luzon with some from the Visayas, he said. Palawan, which previously was under Region 6, is now part of Region 4 (Southern Tagalog). [Text] [Manila MANILA BULLETIN in English 12 Dec 86 p 13 HK] /6662


CSO: 4200/243

THAILAND

CARTOON SATIRIZES PREM, SITTHI SUBSERVIENCE TO U.S.

Bangkok DAILY NEWS in Thai 22 Nov 86 p 5

[Cartoon]



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CSO: 4207/84

LOAN AGREEMENT MADE 'IN PRINCIPLE' WITH INTERNATIONAL BANKS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 29 Nov 86 p 1

[Text]

THAILAND has agreed in principle with five leading international banks for a syndicated loan of US\$300 million (about 7,850 million baht) to be used to refinance its existing loans, Finance Minister Suthee Singsaneh disclosed yesterday.

He expected the deal to be concluded by the middle of next month. The five banks in the syndication are Morgan Guaranty Ltd, Chase Manhattan Bank, Dai Ichi Kangyo, Industrial Bank of Japan and Societe Generale.

Dr Suthee said that the new syndicated loan would be used to refinance the loans borrowed by the Government and to take over Bangchak Petroleum Co from Summit Industrial (Panama) Co, worth about US\$200 million baht.

The balance would be used for other purposes.

Dr Suthee said that each of the five banks would provide US\$60 million to Thailand and that they would approach their own partners to join the syndication.

Under the principle agreed upon between Thailand and the five banks, the repayment period for the loan will be 10 years with a six-year grace period, the interest rate in the first two years of the repayment period will be $\frac{1}{4}\%$ above the London interbank offered rate (Libor), and $\frac{1}{4}\%$ above Libor for the remaining eight years.

The existing loans carry an interest of $\frac{1}{4}\%$ above Libor for the first eight years, and 0.5% above Libor in the final two years.

By refinancing, Dr Suthee said that Thailand would be able to save about US\$20 million or about

528 million baht in terms of interest payments.

He said that Thailand was able to get good conditions from the syndicate banks because of the favourable economic situation in the last fiscal year and the positive projection for this fiscal year.

He said that the country's performance during the past five years was impressive which played a great role in the banks granting the loan.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country in the last fiscal year was slightly below the target of 4%, he said.

The growth in the manufacturing sector was registered at 4.6%, "but the drag was the result of the agricultural sector suffering from the intermittent rainfall," he added. The GDP projection for this fiscal year is 5%, he said.

He also said that the inflation rate for last year was 1.9%, down from the 2% previously, and is projected to be 2% this year, he said.

The current accounts registered a surplus of US\$200 million or about 0.2% of the GDP, and it is projected that the surplus this fiscal year will be the same level.

The balance of payment was in the positive of US\$1.3 billion against the surplus of US\$0.5 billion last year, and it will be US\$1.2-1.3 billion this year.

Export growth was 15.8% despite several protectionist measures by many countries. The foreign reserves were US\$3.5 billion or about four months of export cover.

The debt service ratio was 22.5% in 1985, but it dropped to 20.5% during the last fiscal year and is expected to be lower than 20.0% this fiscal year, Dr Suthee said.

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CSO: 4200/256

EDITORIAL SUPPORTS FISHERIES ACCORD WITH SRV

Bangkok THE NATION in English 3 Dec 86 p 4

[Editorial: "Thailand, Vietnam Fishing Accord Can Be Profitable"]

[Text]

THAILAND has paid Vietnam a 'fine' of about nine million baht (in US dollars at the insistence of Hanoi) to secure the release of 466 Thai fishermen who were captured and jailed by Vietnam for allegedly fishing in Vietnamese waters. Whether it was a legitimate fine or some sort of a ransom, we do not know, although we must add that Thai fishermen are notorious for fishing in the waters of other countries and frequently get caught by Burma, Malaysia and Bangladesh. Already Vietnam has freed 233 of the jailed fishermen who returned to Thailand yesterday.

The arrest of Thai fishermen by Vietnam has been a thorny issue in roller-coaster relations between the two countries. Hanoi will release Thai fishermen, even though at a price, when it wants to improve relations with Bangkok while, on the other hand, it will use aggressive tactics to round up Thai fishermen whenever mutual relations take a dip. The current release of fishermen should be viewed positively considering that the Vietnamese Communist Party Congress is barely a fortnight away and major regional decisions are likely to be taken then.

The principal bone of contention between Thailand and Vietnam is of course the Kampuchean conflict and Hanoi has stepped up its efforts to woo Bangkok into bilateral talks on political issues, mainly on Kam-

puchea. But Bangkok has so far ignored the overtures partly because of the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea and partly because it cannot act alone ignoring fellow-members of ASEAN. For all practical purposes relations are at a dead end.

The Kampuchean question apart, there is little reason why relations between the two countries should be in deep freeze and it is possible that both of them should consider trying a "low politics" approach to explore ways of improving relations through non-political cooperation. Fishing is one of the key areas on which cooperation could be achieved.

Thailand has the expertise, manpower and equipment but unfortunately the imposition of economic zones by neighbouring countries limits very tightly the manoeuvring of Thai fishing vessels. Vietnam, on the other hand, has fertile fishing grounds but lacks the expertise and equipment which Thai fishermen have. Cooperation in fishing in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea should be a highly profitable venture for both countries.

And if some agreement could be reached on a minor matter of fishing it will form some sort of a basis for improving understanding and mutual trust. It could even pave the way for talks on "high politics" between the two countries.

/13046
C50: 4200/255

ACADEMIC: THAI-SRV COMPROMISE OVER CAMBODIA NECESSARY

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 22 Dec 86 p 3

[Excerpt]

THAILAND has set its sights too high in demanding a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea, according to Chulalongkorn University political scientist M.R. Sukhumhand Paribatra.

The Government should instead seek an initial withdrawal from the border area while arranging for a coalition of all the Khmer factions, including that of Heng Samrin, said M.R. Sukhumhand, director of Southeast Asian Security Studies.

Thailand and Vietnam are feeling themselves about their respective status by thinking that the other is worst off, he said, and this had led to the stalemate over Kampuchea.

Thailand and ASEAN have also set their sights too high in demanding a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea while they do not have the potential to back up their credibility.

M.R.Sukhumhand was addressing a seminar organized by the Institute of Security and International Studies and the Student Federation of Thailand at Chulalongkorn on Saturday.

Thailand believes Vietnam is facing severe economic problems and cannot control Kampuchea, while Vietnam believes it is the lord over Laos and Kampuchea

and must keep its position and power, he said.

Neither side would be able to realize their aims because Vietnam wants complete control while Thailand and ASEAN can prevent that only to a limited extent.

"We are not in the position of riding the elephant to catch the locust, but we are riding the locust to catch the elephant. Thailand cannot squeeze Vietnam. Even China cannot squeeze Vietnam," M.R. Sukhumhand said.

DEMAND

Thailand was not yet in the position to demand a total withdrawal. "If we really want Vietnam to pull out all its forces, then we have to be prepared to make war with Vietnam," M.R. Sukhumhand said.

Instead, Thailand should try to decrease the conflict by seeking more compromise by proposing that Vietnam initially pull out from the border area. He said the three factions in the Kampuchean resistance should form a coalition with the Heng Samrin Government and allow it the prime defense and for-

economic ministries.

In that way, the non-Heng Samrin Khmers will grow in their nationalism and could in the long run undermine and eliminate the position of Vietnam in Kampuchea.

Thailand should give up trying to use the Khmer Rouge as a tool since it had not been effective. "Don't allow China to use us as a place to transfer arms to the Khmer Rouge. This will be the signal to Vietnam that we have become more flexible. Then they would be willing to pull out more troops from the border," M.R. Sukhumhand said.

"It is not an easy thing to use the Khmer Rouge because they are independent. We can't squeeze them like clay," he said.

He said Vietnam could not successfully reform its economy if it did not alter its Kampuchean policy because it would be unable to build a corps of technicians or markets in the West. Thailand must allow Vietnam room to be more flexible to reform its economy.

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THAILAND

SMUGGLER FROM CAMBODIA APPREHENDED

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 23 Dec 86 p 3

[Text] A man was caught by highway police trying to smuggle in 5-6 tons of smoked fish worth about one million baht from Kampuchea yesterday.

Payao Ngamching, 33, of Chanthaburi Province, was arrested yesterday on the Ban Bung--Rayong Road in Ban Khai District of Rayong after police searched the truck he was driving and found the smoked fish.

He told police the fish had been shipped from Kampuchea by boat and distributed in Thailand by truck without paying customs duties. He was charged with smuggling.

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HILLTRIBE REFUGEES FACE REPATRIATION IN NORTH

Bangkok THE NATION in English 25 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Pratya Sawetvimon]

[Text] AUTHORITIES are preparing to send more than 2,000 illegal hilltribes immigrants currently living in the northern province of Tak back into Laos, an informed military source said yesterday.

The source told *The Nation* that the hilltribes people, most of them belonging to the Hmong, the Yao, the Lahu and the Akha, have illegally crossed the border from Laos and currently live in Tungyai Narasuan wildlife sanctuary which covers areas in Umphang District and Pup Phra Sub-district of Tak.

He said that groups of the Laotian hilltribes people have trekked across the mountainous Thai-Laotian border in Chiang Kham District of Phayao Province and then proceeded by road to join their friends and relatives in the Tungyai Narasuan area.

The military officer said the Third Army Region, which is responsible for military activities in the northern region, has advised Tak governor to arrange the repatriation of the illegal immigrants since the Interior Ministry is in charge of the matter.

He said the regional army might help transport the Laotian hilltribes people, who are also involved in deforestation in the Tungyai Narasuan forest, to a holding centre or to the frontier.

A senior official in Tak said provincial officials will in the next few days begin to screen the illegal hilltribes immigrants out of those long-time residents of Thailand.

He said some Thai hilltribes people might help bring their friends or relatives of the same tribes from Laos into the province.

He said a military task force, headed by commander of the fourth infantry division, currently takes care of military works to help suppress the deforestation in Tak Province.

The task force, said the source, also assists other government officials in establishing a low-land centre to shelter a few thousands of hilltribes people currently encroaching national forest reserves.

Groups of local "influential" people are reported to be trying to block the plan to set up the low-land hilltribes centre in Pup Phra Sub-district.

Meanwhile, informed sources said the Third Army Region will next month call a meeting among representatives from 22 government and private agencies dealing in hilltribes problems to discuss the establishment of a new coordination centre.

The Cabinet Tuesday approved a proposal by the regional army to set up the centre to coordinate activities of the government, private and foreign agencies towards the hilltribes problems.

The centre, which will be the first regional body to deal with the hilltribes matters, will be set up at the Third Army Region headquarters in the northern province of Phitsanulok.

The Cabinet approved the budget of 2,474,500 baht to be spent in administering the new centre in which the regional army will play a

key role. The centre will be chaired by Lt Gen Chaichana Tareechat, commander of the Third Army Region.

The regional centre will help in coordinating agencies concerned to solve many problems, caused by the hilltribes people in the North. The problems include deforestation, opium and marijuana growing as well as migration of the hilltribes people from neighbouring countries.

It will also help in development projects such as land distribution, and education development for the hilltribes.

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PROTECTION SOUGHT FOR CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AGAINST FOREIGNERS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 3 Dec 86 p 30

[Text]

THE Social Action Party is expected to submit soon an urgent motion for the Government to work out plans and measures to protect Thai contractors from growing foreign participation in Thailand's construction industry, SAP spokesman and former Deputy Commerce Minister Amnuay Yossook said yesterday.

Mr Amnuay added that the party's members have decided to submit the motion as they consider it vital to the Thai construction industry.

"We will ask the Government to review all the problems faced by the industry and to help protect the huge number of Thai contractors. The review will also cover the Prime Minister's Office's bidding regulations in order to be more fair to Thai contractors," he said.

He said the number of construction contracts won by foreign contractors, especially Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese, is growing, causing a great deal of trouble for Thai contractors.

He said the Government will also have to review all the attached conditions when obtaining loans from other countries, particularly Japan which usually ties its loans or grant aid to Japanese engineering design firms and contractors.

He cited the case of the Thai-Japanese Cultural Centre on Ratchadapisek Road, which is totally built by Japanese with grant aid from Japan.

"I think it is time for the Government to seriously talk to the Japanese Government on such practice and tell it to understand our problem and support Thai contractors," he said.

"Although Thai contractors are on par with foreign contractors in terms

of technical know-how, they have failed to compete effectively for cost reasons," he added.

He said there are many factors which have caused Thai contractors to lose out to foreign contractors who are strongly supported by their governments and have an edge in the form of better equipment.

Mr Amnuay said foreign contractors also have better financing with the interest on the loans they obtain abroad to finance their construction work being only 3-4%, against 12% for Thai contractors.

Another factor that helps foreign contractors win more contracts, both government and private, is that they can obtain many raw materials directly from manufacturers and can therefore save a lot on cost.

"When doing construction work here, foreign contractors always adopt a package policy on employment of labour for each contract, thus avoiding the need to be responsible for providing welfare and benefits for workers, unlike Thai contractors," he said.

With this advantage, foreign contractors have managed to outbid Thai contractors and most of the contracts were won at costs under the median levels set by the Thai government agencies which based their costs on locally available raw materials, he said.

To make the matter worse, he said, government agencies tend to go for bidding and get the lowest cost possible with no regard for the possible impact on the Thai construction industry.

These problems, he said, must be solved if the Thai construction industry is to grow, adding: "We have raised the matter with our party

members who are holding portfolios in the Government, but it is necessary to officially urge the Government to look at the problem," he said.

Mr Amnuay said that although the Government has claimed that the situation in this industry will improve next year, any growth would be rather limited as the economy will still be in the recovering stage and it will certainly not be enough for Thai contractors.

"All Thai contractors are suffering losses in many contracts. We have seen them fall one by one and those still operating are facing financial losses," he said.

He stressed that there is definitely a need to protect this Thai industry because not only Thai contractors will be hit, but also labourers and construction material producers.

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FOREIGN MINISTRY PERMANENT SECRETARY PROFILED

Bangkok THE NATION in English 25 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Richard Read]

[Text]

A thinking man's diplomat has returned to head Thailand's foreign service.

M.R. Kasem Samosorn Kasemsri is described as less of an aggressive actor than Arsa Sarasin, whom Kasem replaced last fall as permanent secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The two men exchanged jobs, as Arsa became ambassador to the United States and Kasem returned from Washington, D.C. to the No.3 slot in the ministry.

Consistent with his intellectual reputation, Kasem has embarked on a philosophical course in his second term in the prestigious position.

He said during a recent interview that he intends to create "think tanks" made up of prominent academics, members of the Press and others to advise the ministry.

"I want free-wheeling debate of the issues pertinent to the time," Kasem said. "In the end, think tanks give you a broader vision, they give you choices and options."

Kasem said that efforts to encourage regional trade and to counter US protectionism will be among the most important initiatives of his tenure.

But he said he planned to work on the home front to improve coordination within the ministry, developing a comprehensive approach to foreign relations

that would transcend the disciplines of his highly specialized staff.

Kasem, 55, is responsible for Thailand's 49 embassies, presiding over a department with 1,200 employees and an annual budget of 1,066 million baht. A career diplomat, he has served in the Philippines, Indonesia and the People's Republic of China.

Sarasin Viraphol, whom Kasem installed as deputy director general of the ministry's department of political affairs, describes his boss as "an intellectual pragmatist" who often dreams up original approaches to solve delicate problems.

"Sometimes he has rather unorthodox ideas," Sarasin said. "He'll look at a problem from more than the usual number of dimensions, and often seems to come up with a new angle."

Sarasin recalled that in 1985, Kasem worked as ambassador with a Thai delegation in Washington, D.C., attempting to head off effects of the infamous protectionist legislation sponsored by US Rep Ed Jenkins.

"He used his resourcefulness in suggesting certain ways to get out of impasses, and it led to agreement," Sarasin said.

Others say Kasem's philosophical approach has drawbacks, however. They note the effectiveness with which Arsa seized the occasion of Jenkins' recent visit to Bangkok, travelling back to Thailand to

impress points on the congressional delegation. During that November visit, the congressmen said they had been unaware of economic problems brought on Thailand by their legislation — legislation that was considered during Kasem's tenure as ambassador.

But Kasem defended his record, saying such statements did not mean he had been asleep at the wheel.

"I wish I had the temerity to ask the congressmen the question: 'If you knew (about the adverse effects on Thailand), would you still do it?'" Kasem said. "And I think the answer would have been 'Yes.' Whether it was going to hurt Thailand or not probably became a little irrelevant."

David Lyman, former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand, said that he felt the complementary talents and combined experience of Kasem and Arsa now make them a strong team in dealings with the United States.

"From the standpoint of Thai-US relations, it's good to have Kasem in the driver's seat here," said Lyman, of Tilleke & Gibbons law firm.

During his four-year American stint, Kasem initiated what became known as the ASEAN road show. Together, the ambassadors from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations travelled around the United States, making joint appearances before rotary clubs, business groups and conferences.

"We used what I term 'collective leverage' in promoting the region's economic and political achievements," Kasem said. "I was able to command the attention of people better than I could do on my own."

Kasem's emphasis on regional issues shows every sign of continuing in his current position. He has been instrumental in the recent push to improve relations with Laos.

"We feel that if we have something going for both sides, then it will not be to the advantage of anybody to upset the cart," he said.

He oversaw preparations for the October visit of Indian Prime

Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and he is playing a major role in preparations for the ASEAN summit meeting upcoming next spring.

In his years in the foreign service, Kasem has watched Thailand's embassies in the region grow in importance as the stature of some Western embassies has waned.

"I remember when I was sent as ambassador to Indonesia, relatives and friends were a little worried," he said, recalling the reaction in 1972. "They said, 'Why not get a post in Rome?' and all that. It was tough to explain to people."

But Kasem was soon to be awarded a major assignment by anyone's measure. In 1975, he became the first Thai ambassador to China.

He was acknowledged as an effective ambassador in Peking, managing to hold together the bilateral relationship despite Bangkok's public attitude of hostility at that time toward communist nations.

Educated at Cambridge University in England, Kasem served abroad as an envoy in the Philippines from 1963 to 1965 and then at home as this country's council representative to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. He was embassy charge d'affairs in Canada from 1971 to 1972.

Kasem now commutes one hour by car from his home on Sukhumvit Soi 26 to his office overlooking the gleaming gable spires of Wat Phra Kaeo. Each morning in the office grounds, he passes a statue of his mother's father, HRH Prince Devawongse Varoprakar, the famous Thai diplomat.

An avid golfer who recently gave up smoking a pipe, Kasem tries to clear time for reading and reflection. He wears conservative suits to his office, an airy, spacious room that he keeps neat and tastefully decorated with art and fresh flowers.

Appearances are important in diplomacy, particularly so to a man described in various quarters as a consummate old-school diplomat.

"He's a superb diplomat in the traditional sense," said one foreign-affairs expert. "But diplomacy has moved somewhat from an art to a science or industry now. One has to work harder rather than putting the emphasis on decorum."

Kasem said he was in tune with these changes, having shown in America that he could take the initiative.

"I was able to accomplish, to a certain degree, because first I decided to go out and meet people without waiting for them to take the initiative to invite me, in many instances," he said. "There you've got to go out in order to try to mold the opinions of several people, which means it's so difficult for you to achieve in a short time."

Due to his aristocratic background and his tendency to expound on subjects at some length, some describe Kasem as aloof. But those close to him say he is personable and does not ultimately stand on ceremony.

"He doesn't run around blowing his own horn, claiming credit," said one close associate in the ministry. "He just wants to get the job done."

Foreign Minister ACM Siddhi Savetsila said Kasem is a trusted adviser and friend.

"He's thinker," Siddhi agreed. Subordinates at the Foreign Ministry said Kasem sets out general policy guidelines instead of issuing detailed instructions. He expects his staff members to develop specific implementation strategies on their own.

His introduction of think-tank meetings is bound to enhance Kasem's popularity with younger members of the foreign service, many of whom see the

institution as isolated.

"The foreign service is regarded as a kind of twilight zone," said one four-year employee. "It becomes perceived as one of the foreigners itself. I think the younger people here perceive this more acutely, because we're more in touch with the outside."

Kasem volunteered with a smile that the think-tank concept could make some ministry veterans nervous.

"Think tanks can frighten people off because they come up with all sorts of ideas," he said. But the technique has been proven elsewhere, he said.

"In Thailand, whenever we have a problem, we call a meeting," Kasem said. "In America, you call meetings without there being any problems, in order to broaden your vision and to understand. That is something which I think is remarkable."

Kasem traced generally high morale in the foreign service to the institution's rigorous selectivity. Twenty graduates received jobs last year out of about 4,000 applicants; this year, almost 5,000 applications were received.

But Kasem said frequent changes in assignments help keep employees challenged as they move from home to various stations abroad.

"Diplomats are people who like changes," he said.

As for potential changes ahead in his own career, Kasem didn't say. But Kasem, who was a senator in Parliament in 1982, is said to have political ambitions, and observers would not be surprised by a run at the position of foreign minister in the years ahead.

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GENERAL COMMENTS ON FUTURE OF ARMY, POLITICS

Bangkok THE NATION in English 3 Dec 86 p 5

[Text]

THE future "small but combat ready" army is required to master not only military skills but also political and diplomatic capabilities. The future development of the Thai army is based on a perception of a future war that the country may have to face.

The thinking was enunciated by Lt Gen Somkit Chongpaya, the commanding general of the Training Command of the Royal Thai Army, in a speech he presented at the Eleventh Pacific Armies Management Seminar in Bangkok during Nov 27-Dec 9. The topic of his paper is "Capabilities and Tactics."

Lt Gen Somkit cited a quote from the book: "Our Great Spring Victory" by Vietnamese Defence Minister Gen Van Tien Dung to back up his contention that the potential means of war in the future would be a combination of military operations, politics and diplomatic efforts.

Van Tien Dung was quoted as saying: "... coordinate the political and military struggle with diplomacy." This policy, Lt Gen Somkit said, has been adopted by Vietnam in its war effort in Kampuchea. But when it came to the development of political capability for the future, Lt Gen Somkit's explanation sounds conceptual. He outlined the "capability of geographical integration," "social participation," "efficient state's administrative machinery," and "public mobilization" as the key components that the new generation of armymen should take in to develop their political capability.

Geographical integration, according to Lt Gen Somkit, is the principle of assimilating people with different religions and dialects, for example the population in the South, together under the Thai political system which grants freedom in practising one's own religious faith and active

participation in the national well being and ruling system.

As for social participation, Lt Gen Somkit said that it is another factor in political capability that helps every group of people to mix with one another, so that everyone has the right to participate in the administration, not separated into classes or groups, and integrated into a democratic system that supports a government. With this system, he said, the people are given a sense of responsibility and morality.

Referring to the third factor of state machinery, he said that the government will lose its stability, endangering the national interests if the state organs failed to function effectively.

Public mobilization, he said, is the means for the government to get full support from the people. "This means the government, the army, and the people must enjoy cordial relationship," he said.

As for the case of Thailand, Lt Gen Somkit also referred to the constructive roles by HM the King that have made him the pillar of the Thai society, "a force that creates an unbreakable bondage among the Thai people."

On diplomatic capability, Lt Gen Somkit sought to underline its importance as a means to deter aggression from a potential enemy.

Citing the diplomatic exercise by Thailand on the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, Lt Gen Somkit said that the key to a successful diplomacy is its just cause which will drum up international support for the Thai position.

He said that the army will exercise its combat capability, a result of "war preparations" and the application of war tactics, when a critical situation arises in case of our failure to apply diplomatic and political policy to dissuade the enemy from launching a military adventure.

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INSTITUTE'S PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC FORECASTING REVIEWED

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 8 Dec 86 p 26

[Interview with Dr Virabhongse Ramangkura by Sunissa Hancock, date and place not given]

[Text] ■ Dr Virabhongse, last December the Thailand Research Development Institute made some very controversial forecasts concerning the economy in 1986 — which were not only refuted at that time by a number of people, but which have since turned out to be quite inaccurate. How do you account for the fact that the country's much-vaunted "think tank" was so wrong?

□ If I may first review the forecasts we made last year — we predicted low growth for the economy with the low case being 2.8%, the high case 3.6% and the base 3.2%; a debt service ratio which would be higher than 28% and which could reach 30% in the next two to three years; and finally, a growing unemployment problem especially where people with higher education are concerned. These predictions were based on certain assumptions — that the oil price would be US\$25 a barrel for the next five years, that interest rates would remain high, that the exchange rates between the US dollar and other currencies would be stable.

After the predictions were made, however, everything changed. The oil price went down to US\$15 a barrel and then even lower, interest rates plunged and the US dollar vis-a-vis other currencies — especially the yen — got weaker and weaker. The result was that the assumptions we used in making our predictions were no longer accurate.

Forecasts are conditional on assumptions and when the three major assumptions we used turned out to be wrong, our forecasts were wrong as well.

■ Things have certainly turned out to be better this year than had been expected, haven't they?

□ Psychologically, things are slightly better. The country's trade balance has improved greatly, especially where the current account balance is concerned. From having had a deficit of about 40,000 million baht in this account, we are now in a nearly balanced situation. In the first nine months of this year, we had a surplus of about 7,000 million baht, basically due to the drop in the oil bill. The decline in interest rates has meant a fall in debt repayments so that the debt service ratio is lower than had been estimated.

Another surprising factor this year is the expansion of non-traditional export items. This is especially true of textiles to new markets — Asia, the Middle East and the European Community — making this the first year that we will fulfil our EC textile quota. Exports of marine products, canned fruits and vegetables, boneless chicken — these are all selling well.

Our money vis-a-vis the yen and some European currencies has weakened and this has been of benefit to us. Even though the value of our traditional exports might not have been very good, the volume of exports has been satisfactory so that overall, the country's export performance this year has not been as bad as it was last year.

■ The TDRI is supposed to have some of the best brains in this country, so how do you account for the fact that more ordinary folks were able to come up with predictions and assumptions which have since turned out to be more realistic and accurate?

□ I really can't say!

At the time we made the forecasts, however, there was no sign that the oil price would fall by as much as it did eventually. There was talk that the oil

price was coming down, but though we waited and waited, nothing happened. We cross-checked the matter with people whose business is to make long-term forecasts concerning the oil price — people at the World Bank, petroleum institutions and so on. No one had any definite answers.

At the same time, time was running out on us since we had to prepare our papers and get our forecasts ready for the Pattaya seminar. So, we went ahead and assumed a slight drop in the oil price — from US\$32 to US\$28.

Where interest rates were concerned, no one can really predict what is going to happen in the short term. So the practice is to estimate the short-term movements from long-term predictions.

As for forecasts of world growth rates, these came mainly from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank projections. Forecasts of commodity prices, too, came from the experts in the field.

The point I'm making is that we didn't just sit back and dream up assumptions. We used what we thought were the best possible references. Unfortunately, as it turned out, we made the wrong assumptions which, in turn, made our forecasts wrong.

Others were luckier!

Given that some members of the TDRI serve as advisers to the Prime Minister and other policy-makers, there has been some concern that the Government's economic policies might have been misdirected — a case of the policies being based on the TDRI's inaccurate forecasts. Is this concern valid?

You know, even though our figures might have been somewhat inaccurate, there was nothing wrong with the direction of the predictions we made. In point of fact, there is no real difference between a growth rate of 3.2% or 4%. The magnitude is not that great. What's more, a growth rate of 4% doesn't mean that the economy is not slowing down. It is and this is still true even though our latest revised forecast places the growth rate for 1986 at 4.3% — and incidentally, this forecast is slightly more optimistic than the 4% forecast made by the National Economic and Social Development Board and the Bank of Thailand.

The fact remains that the problems which were forecast — the low growth rates, unemployment and so on — still exist. So, to say that government policies were misdirected as a result of the TDRI's inaccurate predictions would not be correct, for there is nothing inaccurate about the direction, the trend, of events.

And by the way, I would like to say that our influence on government policies has

been vastly overrated. It is the Bank of Thailand and the NESDB which prepare the background papers for the Government in its decision-making process. It is the Finance Ministry which calculates the country's debt service ratio for the Government. The Prime Minister, in fact, quotes the NESDB and not the TDRI in talking of the country's expected growth rate. He has, in fact, said in the past that he didn't believe some of our predictions!

The fact of the matter is that we — the Prime Minister's advisers, the TDRI — are nowhere as important as people make us out to be, for the Government frequently doesn't listen to its advisers!

■ And yet, this is not the impression that most people have. It has, you know, been noticeable that every time people such as yourself — the academics and technocrats at such places as the TDRI — have gone public on, say, the country's debt service ratio, things have ground to a halt as projects are reviewed and postponed yet again. Are opportunities lost as a result of this? Especially when it is later shown that your debt service estimates were, in fact, wrong?

I don't think so, for whether we want to accept it or not, the fact remains that we have to get our house in order.

It is true our debt service estimate turned out to be wrong, but this wasn't because we were trying to fool anyone! We are researchers, not speculators, and any predictions or forecasts we made are based on our best information. Though we checked and cross-checked everything as carefully as possible, we did not foresee the expansion of exports which resulted in the debt service ratio falling.

However, that is not important. What is important is that our stock of debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is still high — in the region of 40-45%. The lower debt service ratio experienced this year has been a windfall for us, but it must be remembered that our outstanding debt has not been reduced in any way.

We don't know how long the favourable conditions such as those experienced this year will last. So, this is the perfect time for us to get things in order so that we will be in the position to borrow more when the next oil shock occurs. If we don't do this now, we won't have any room to manoeuvre in the future.

It must also be remembered that even though things look better, the country's fiscal situation has not actually improved. We still have a revenue shortfall due mainly to the fact that we are still experiencing a recession. Government expenditure can't increase, for this depends on the amount of its revenue — a

case of the budget deficit being fixed at a certain percentage by law.

It is these factors which are the constraints on government activities, not our forecasts. They only serve to remind the Government of the actual situation which exists. Sometimes the Government chooses to be reminded, but sometimes it doesn't.

■ One of the criticisms levied against the TDRI last year was that it verged on the irresponsible, for the unduly pessimistic forecasts it made affected the image of the country in the eyes of foreign lenders, investors and so on. Would you agree?

□ That's not true at all. We predicted a base growth rate of 3.2%, and while that is a low figure by our standards, it is not low at all when compared to the growth rates of other countries.

Look around the region. Around ASEAN. We were the only country to actually record any growth. In the eyes of others, we were doing well. Where we were concerned, however, the situation wasn't good since we are used to higher growth rates.

As for our debt service figures — those aren't secret. All the figures are published by the Bank of Thailand. All we did was to rearrange, analyse, systematise and match them with future predictions. All our creditors know where to look for these same figures. They also know how to look at them. They all prepare country risk reports, and despite of our forecasts, Thailand's rating, where creditors are concerned, improved.

These, after all, depend on performance, not forecasts. What's more, the fact that we are aware of our problems and that we have a policy of addressing them is a point in our favour.

■ While the TDRI is not the only organisation to make economic forecasts, it does appear to be the most controversial. Is this because the TDRI has a higher profile than other organisations? Because of the very large number of academics to be found there? Something which has incidentally led to people saying that the country is now being run by academics who are more familiar with economic modelling than economic reality. Could you comment on this?

□ Academics are always criticised for living in an ivory tower, but this criticism isn't always valid. Those of us at the TDRI make it a point to work closely with the technocrats in government organisations such as the Bank of Thailand, the NESDB, the Finance Ministry, the Commerce Ministry. We have available to us a vast array of facts and figures, and even though we might not be able to use all of them in our research activities for security reasons, we are, nevertheless, well

aware of the real world.

Where the TDRI itself is concerned, we didn't set out to make a big noise. However, the fact that we are the only non-government research institution has led to us having a high profile — a fortunate event in some ways, for it has made more people in this country interested in such things as research activities, forecasting and so on. It has also meant that even though government organisations might not use our forecasts or findings, they have had to take note of it. And, when our figures diverged greatly from their own, it has meant that they have had to check and cross-check their own figures.

Look what happened after the Pattaya conference last year. People were so angry with us and our forecasts that they immediately made their own forecasts and publicised them! Prior to that time, everyone automatically quoted government forecasts without first checking to see how valid they were. We at the TDRI challenged this blind acceptance. This has, in turn, led to others challenging us, and the result has been the development of research techniques in Thailand.

What's more, the criticisms and discussions which resulted from the Pattaya conference has led to greater interest being taken in updating forecasts so that what is available to everyone now is more accurate and more up-to-date forecasts.

Whether people agree with our forecasts is unimportant. What is important is that more people are being made aware of research techniques and the importance of cross-checking all forecasts and predictions. Once we achieve this, then perhaps we should move towards a lower profile!

■ Can we expect excitement again this year when you hold your annual Pattaya seminar to publicise your findings for the year and your forecasts for next year?

□ Well, we haven't set out to be controversial, but I have the feeling that the seminar this year will be just about as controversial as the one last year!

After all, we will be making forecasts, and anything based on forecasts tends to be controversial. The theme this year is national resource management. This has been broken down into three sub-topics: financial resource management, human resource management and natural resource management.

Of these topics, human resource management will probably be the least controversial. Natural resource management could be slightly more so, for though it is based mainly on objective factors, there are subjective elements involved. The subject of financial resource management will definitely be controversial for assumptions and forecasts are going to have to be made.

I must say I am looking forward to the seminar. It will be fun!

THANK YOU, DR VIRABHONGSE.

NORTHEAST ECONOMY CONTINUES TO STAGNATE

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 18 Dec 86 p 16

[Text]

THE northeastern economy remained sluggish this year because of weak prices for such major crops as rice, maize, kenaf and sugar-cane, according to the Research Office of Bangkok Bank, which added that the outlook for 1987 would be a slight improvement with the prices of some major crops rising.

It said this year's sluggish economic situation was reflected in the poor sales of motorcycles, farm machinery and small trucks resulting from the low purchasing power of the northeastern people.

It said the price level of the region rose by 1.9% this year, while deposits with commercial banks grew by only 4.6% in the first half of the year, down from 8.4% in the first six months of 1985, to low income level and several reductions in interest rates.

It added that commercial banks' credits fell by 4.5% in the same period, compared to an increase of 2.7% in the first half of last year, as slow business discouraged investment and put many loans at risk. As a result, liquidity at commercial banks in the Northeast was high, with the credit-to-deposit ratio standing at 76.7%, compared to 69.6% for the whole country.

The office said that next year, the agricultural price level was expected to increase by not more than 2%, while growth in deposits with commercial banks would remain low, but credits should pick up somewhat. Many obstacles to investment would remain and as a result, liquidity was expected to drop slightly, it added.

It said the Northeast contributed 14% to the country's Gross Domestic Product last year, adding that the northeastern economy's constituents are agriculture (28.5%), trade

(26.7%), services (10.2%), manufacturing (5.4%), construction (5.8%), mining and quarrying (0.7%), and others (2.6%).

By sector, the office gave the following pictures:

PRODUCTION AND TRADE

Cassava. Total output in the 1985-86 season was estimated at 9.23 million tons, down by 16.2% from the previous season, due to price disincentives. Domestic trade was lively and the price tended upwards, averaging 116.2 baht per 100 kilograms at factory gate in Nakhon Ratchasima, up by 7.7%. The prices of tapioca chips and hard pellets averaged 2,484 and 2,628 baht per ton, up by 66.1% and 57.4%, respectively, while the price of flour rose by 52.5% to 5,000 baht per ton. Tapioca products were expected to have earned the region 11,064 million baht this year.

For the 1986-87 season, production is expected to increase to 11.11 million tons and trade to remain brisk. However, the Nakhon Ratchasima price level will drop by 8-17% to 100-110 baht per hundred kg.

Rice. In the 1985-86 season, the region produced 6.87 million tons of paddy worth about 15,800 million baht, slightly lower than the previous season due to drought. The price of the highest quality paddy fell to as low as 2,200 per ton early in the season. It later rebounded to 3,200 baht, with most of the advantage going to traders and millers who have storage facilities.

For the 1986-87 season, there should be a good harvest in the upper part of the region due to plentiful rainfall and as a result, prices are likely to remain weak. Paddy output in the lower part of the region was somewhat affected by a dry spell, but

the damage was on the whole not very extensive.

Maize. The Northeast accounts for about a quarter of Thailand's total maize crop. In the 1985-86 season, the region produced 500,000 tons with a farm gate value of 1,400 baht per ton.

The price has been very soft due to oversupply on world markets. With world stocks still growing and the US Farm Act beginning to bite, the price is likely to remain low in the 1986-87 season.

Cane and sugar. In 1985-86, 2,948 million tons of cane were produced in the Northeast and processed into 335,000 tons of sugar, down by 11.4% and 9.7%, respectively, from the previous season. The preliminary price of cane was set at 323 baht per ton. It was earlier thought that the actual price might reach 420-430 baht as world product was 2 million tons short of demand. But the price weakened for two reasons: output estimates for 1986-87 narrowed the supply-demand gap to only 1 million tons, prompting buyers to slow purchases, and the US signed a contract with China to sell sugar at well below market prices. Thus the final price of cane dropped to 380-390 baht per ton.

The 1986-87 crop is likely to be 23 million tons, 4.34% lower than 1985-86, as some cane planters have turned to other crops including cassava. But as weather has been favourable, productivity should remain high. The cane price is expected to be 400-410 baht per ton as world prices for sugar firm up.

Kenaf. The 1985-86 production was 283,000 tons, up by 38.4% from the previous season, as the price in 1984-85 was exceptionally attractive. The average price was about 5.00 baht per kg in the previous season but declined to 3.87 baht this season.

For 1986-87, a harvest of 233,040 tons is foreseen, considerably less than in 1985-86, as price incentives have attracted farmers to grow cassava instead. As demand is not likely to rise much, next year's kenaf price should remain around this year's level.

Gunny bags. Production in 1986 was estimated at 160 tons, up only 1.8% over last year. Factories plan to keep output at the 1986 level next year as demand both at home and abroad remains weak.

SALES OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Motorcycles. The market remained weak and in the first half of this year, sales were 30% down from the same period of 1985 as the public's purchasing power was low, while

prices rose by 20% as a result of the stronger yen.

Small trucks. Sales dropped by 40% in the first six months of this year from January-June 1985 as the prices of farm products were low and the high value of the yen raised the prices of small trucks by about 10%. The outlook for 1987 is not favourable as agricultural prices are likely to remain weak and the prices of vehicles to increase further.

Farm machinery. These items have not been selling well as farmers, with their depleted purchasing power, tend to mend old equipment and borrow or hire them from one another, thus putting them to maximum use. For this reason, spare parts have been selling well despite higher prices. So have hand tillers which are now considered essentials and whose prices have been kept within the farmer's reach. Little improvement is envisaged for 1987.

TOURISM

Efforts to develop this region as a tourist destination have not yet produced satisfactory results, chiefly because, despite the many natural and cultural attractions there, the area is so huge that package tours are difficult. There are good hotels in such major provinces as Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen and Udon Thani, but the accommodation elsewhere is somewhat spartan. Communications both by road and air have been much improved, but there is still room for further improvement.

INVESTMENT AND CONSTRUCTION

The investment climate continued bearish. In the first seven months of this year, only three projects with investments totalling 133 million baht received promotional privileges from the Board of Investment, down by 25% and 42.9%, respectively, from January-July 1985.

In the same period, 246 factories received permission to be set up, down by 59%, and 30 were given permission to expand, up by 36.4%. Four projects each involving an investment of over 10 million baht were approved by the Industry Ministry.

The total area for which construction permits were issued in municipal zones fell by 28% to 284,800 square metres, of which 182,200 square metres was for domestic housing units. It is thought that housing construction by people with fixed incomes expanded in the second half of the year because of falling interest rates, while government measures will cause construction to pick up further in 1987.

BANKING AND FINANCE

By the end of June 1986, the region had 257 commercial bank branches, 101 branches of the Government Savings bank, 17 of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives and two finance companies.

Deposits at the major institutions at the end of June end-June totalled 47,211 million baht. Growth in deposits at commercial banks slowed, while that of the GSB rose slightly. Most credits were accounted for by commercial banks and the BAAC which together extended 37,507 million baht.

Deposits at commercial banks in the Northeast grew by only 4.6% to 41,075 million baht at the end of June 1986, down from 8.4% in the first half of 1985, due to low farm earnings, lower remittances from northeastern workers in the Middle East and falling interest rates.

Credits fell by 4.5% to 30,797 million baht, compared to a 2.7% increase in the first half of 1985. The fall was due mainly to the fact that weakening prices discouraged merchants from stocking produce, entrepreneurs were postponing investments, many factories had excess production capacities and the Government's moves to stimulate the economy were not effective enough to get business moving, while commercial banks were being very cautious in extending loans.

The structure of commercial bank credits in the Northeast at the end of June 1986 was: 41.1% for trade, 17.4% for industry, 14.5% for agriculture, 12.9% for consumption, 6.7% for construction, 4.2% for services and 1.5% for real estate. The outlook for deposits and credits in the Northeast in 1987 is not expected to change significantly.

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CSO: 4200/256

LOW INTEREST RATES TO BE CHARGED FOR CROPS IN STORAGE

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 23 Dec 86 p 3

[Text]

THE Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives has decided to charge three per cent interest on loans extended to all farmers in order to store crops while prices are low.

Deputy government spokesman Montri Chenvidyakarn said the decision was reached at a meeting yesterday of the Rice Policy Committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Sonthi Bunyachai.

The interest rate was extensively debated after the BAAC suggested the three per cent rate be imposed only on its 273,000 customers. The bank wanted a higher rate for other borrowers.

Dr Montri said 5,000 million baht in loans to be extended by the bank would help about 273,000 farmers who are customers and another 420,000 farmers to keep up to 2.6 million tonnes of paddy in their barns while prices are low.

Farmers who are entitled to seek loans amounting to 30,000 baht each from the bank must have barns of their own. Farmers without barns have to borrow with farmers who do.

The bank would give loans amounting to 80 per cent of the value of the paddy and the bank must be notified if it is sold.

The bank also expressed concern about bad debts. In such cases the Government had agreed to compensate the bank, but at only five per cent of the amount loaned to farmers.

A government source, however, quoted Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda as telling the Council of Economic Ministers yesterday that the Government was willing to risk losing the money as long as the farmers benefited from the loans.

Dr Montri said the meeting also asked the BAAC if it could postpone the repayment period for loans extended to farmers at three per cent interest until after next March.

The bank has wanted to impose a 12.5 per cent rate on loans whose repayment date is after March.

The Bank of Thailand was told yesterday to find ways to ease restrictions on the extension of 5,000 million baht re-discount facility by the central bank through commercial banks to rice millers at three per cent interest in order to purchase paddy from farmers during the harvest season.

Of the five billion baht available, only about 180 million baht has been loaned to millers.

In practice a miller has to put up collateral to get a loan from a commercial bank carrying a 12 per cent interest rate. Only when he seeks packing credit from the same bank using paddy as collateral is the miller charged the three per cent rate.

The meeting deferred decisions on requests by the Interior Ministry, the Army and the Marketing Organisation for Farmers for allocations amounting to 396 million, 200 million and 100 million baht respectively to buy rice from farmers.

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CSO: 4200/256

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

CGDK WEAKNESSES, LACK OF PROGRESS IN WAR DESCRIBED

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 6 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Jacques Sekaert]

[Text]

A FEW weeks ago, once again, Bangkok filled up with rumours about a merge between the two nationalist armies of the Khmer resistance. The idea is nothing new but one that has never really got off the ground. Recently, one of the anti-Vietnamese resistance's main sponsors suggested that it might not be a bad idea if Prince Norodom Sihanouk would agree to become the leader of both nationalist groups, his own Funcinpec and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front.

The latter group, the KPNLF, has during the past two years suffered badly from a series of problems, chaos resulting from the 1984-85 strong Vietnamese dry season offensive, which destroyed all KPNLF camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border. Later, a powerful group of dissidents challenged the way President Son Sann was running the Front, and human right abuses in the central region — mostly the responsibility of two KPNLF camp commanders and their troops — got more and more outrageous by the day, giving the Front its worst image since its foundation in October 1979.

The commander-in-chief of the KPNLF armed forces, General Sak Sutsakhan, was not opposed to such a "rapprochement" between the troops under his command and those of the National Sihanoukian Army (ANS).

A few weeks ago Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the ANS commander-in-chief and Sihanouk's personal representative for

Asia and Kampuchea, went to see his father in Paris. Prince Sihanouk's answer was simple and clear: thank you but no.

The prince explained he did not want to be accused of trying to "abstain" the other nationalist group, a move that would probably trigger endless attacks by republican Khmers, some of whom are staunch supporters of the KPNLF.

Sihanouk also said that the People's Republic of China would always oppose such a move. The nationalists, said the prince, could not afford to antagonise China, the resistance's main benefactor and its principal arm supplier. Finally, Sihanouk told friends that such a "merge" would not at this junction represent a progress. He agreed, however, that individuals from the KPNLF troops would be welcome into the ranks of the ANS. It was, Sihanouk said, better than to encourage them to join the Heng Samrin regime, which many did in the past year.

Indeed, the KPNLF is still torn by internal conflicts and the ANS has a few unsolved problems on its own.

So once again as the dry season begins, the idea of a nationalist merge has been postponed.

□ □ □

SHORTLY after he came back from Paris, Prince Ranariddh flew to the United States. Supporters of the resistance believe it is a good time to tour the Federal Capital since the US mood toward Kampuchea is far from jaundiced.

Most American officials we met a few weeks ago at the United Nations or in Washington expressed disappointment at the past performances of the "NCR" or the "non-communist resistance." A report presented recently to the US Congress by journalist Al Santoli strongly criticising the KPNLF for a wide range of human rights abuses did, of course, little to improve the resistance's status on the Hill.

As one American officials told us: "The KPNLF ever since 1979 has been portrayed here as the best and most democratic component of the Khmer resistance. The Khmer Rouge was bad, absolutely bad. And Sihanouk, while seen as a key and respected figure, was widely believed to be without troops."

Today, with the KPNLF in trouble, many interested Americans have reached the conclusion that Kampuchea is a lost cause.

Violations of human rights is nothing new in the central area of Kampuchea. Just like black market. But as black market is an understandable, if sometimes dubious, form of economy — one that always flourishes in troubled times (and often guarantees the survival of a nation) — the many abuses suffered by Khmer innocent civilians and also by Thai villagers along the border have certainly no justification.

The report submitted to the US Congress put a lot of the blames at the door of the dissidents inside the KPNLF. It suggested that people like General Sak Sutsakhan, Dr Gaffar Peang Meth and others rebelled because President Son Sann wanted to put an end to the abuses. This sounds more like a fairly tale than reality. While no one is suggesting that Mr Son Sann has ever encouraged such unallowable behaviour, the fact is that little was ever done to tame commanders like Liv Ne and Chea Chhut. They and their men have a long record of brutality and corruption. But they were convenient because they controlled troops and added a few thousand men to a faction which at first was anxious to present itself as the only choice for a future non-communist Kampuchea. The two men were tolerated even as the KPNLF leadership was made

aware of their misdeeds. Chea Chhut, in 1982, was appointed a member of the KPNLF military hierarchy. I can remember a time when a few US diplomats in Bangkok were trying to picture him as some kind of vigorous "freedom fighter" (a term much abused these days), because he had managed to take over a practically abandoned Vietnamese position.

On the November 19, General Sak Sutsakhan released a communique explaining that he had "recently dissolved two KPNLF battalions which were found involved in violations of human rights of the Khmer population, and dismissed the two battalion commanders who had fled into the interior."

The same communique claimed that the infamous "Chamcha Kor" market, where people arriving from inside Kampuchea were brutally "welcomed" by Liv Ne's men, had been closed. This has been confirmed by an independent source and is probably one of the best possible news for the Kampuchean (and the Vietnamese refugees) in a long time.

The problem is, people like Liv Ne and Chea Chhut have been operating their racket with at least some external support. Can a well-meaning general really put an end to a problem that made already so much damage to people (Vietnamese, Khmers and Thais), to the resistance, its image and future?

We understand that General Sak Sutsakhan is serious about dealing with violations and abuses. One reliable Khmer source told us he could even take some action against people close to him should they revealed themselves tainted with corruption.

The Santoli paper, while generally correct when reporting individual abuses, tends to put the blame on the wrong people — both General Sak Sutsakhan and Dr Gaffar said they would eventually take legal action to clear their names — and praises some strange characters.

The inspiration for much of the accusations appears to come from one faction of the KPNLF. In 1983 Al Santoli himself wrote an uncritical account of Chea Chhut military actions in the liberal American weekly, *The New Republic*.

WHILE the Front struggles to regain some credibility and give some aspiration to its 8,000 or so soldiers, Prince Ranariddh, on the eve of his American trip, painted a more optimistic picture of the situation. "There has been some real progress among certain KPNLF units," he told us before expressing satisfaction at the behaviour of several units of the ANS.

The Sihanoukist army claimed to have, on November 26, taken several successful initiatives in coordination with Khmer Rouge elements in Odder Meanchey. The prince insisted that several recent operations of the ANS in at least three provinces had only been possible because of active support from soldiers of the People's Army of Kampuchea (PRKAF or "Heng Samrin" army).

Will the dry season bring any Vietnamese offensive along border? News from the border is somewhat contradictory. Reliable sources denied that Site 2 had been evacuated a few days ago by members of the international agencies. Recent visitors to Phnom Penh

described the security in the capital as "quite relaxed" and saw no barrages between the city and its airport, Pochentong, claimed by the Khmer Rouge to be the target of frequent small scale attacks.

Given the flurry of diplomatic activities — real or imaginary — the dry season will be important for all the parties involved. The nationalist resistance needs to demonstrate to their supporters that they are still worth the aid they receive. The Khmer Rouge are said to be determined to strike in force and prove to the world their alleged progress on the ground. The PRKAF still has to be convinced of its capacity for an independent life. Vietnam recently scored a minor diplomatic point with its suggestion, made to Austrian diplomats, of a meeting between representatives of the PRK and the coalition. If the People's Army of Vietnam is serious about its definite 1990 withdrawal, as Minister Vo Dong Giang told us in New York last October, it must show some important — if not decisive — success on the battlefield.

Nobody so far has any special reason to cheer, especially not the Khmer population.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

REFUGEES CITE FEAR, RELUCTANCE TO SUPPORT CGDK

Bangkok THE NATION in English 11 Dec 86 p 5

[Article by Tom Heneghan]

[Excerpts]

KHAO-I-DANG — Thousands of Kampuchean refugees huddled in bamboo and thatch huts at this refugee camp in eastern Thailand have lost all hope of escaping the conflicts that plague their homeland.

Most have watched for years as other refugees with family abroad, better education or no political background left for a new life in the US, France, Australia or other countries.

They could still dream of a new life until last July when Thailand, frustrated at growing western reluctance to take Indochinese refugees, threatened to reclassify the 24,000 here as illegal immigrants due to return to Kampuchea.

In the workshops, schools and smugglers' markets dotting this tightly-guarded settlement, located 30 km north of the eastern Thai border town of Aranyaprathet, every refugee I spoke to opposed the move to the border camps.

All said the refugees in those camps, which have frequently been attacked by Vietnamese troops, looked down on them as traitors for living in Khao-I-Dang.

The refugees feared they could eventually be forced to return to the land they fled after Vietnam invaded in late 1978 and installed Heng Samrin in power.

"I have fallen into despair," said Sek Yen, 41, the highest-ranking official of the Phnom Penh leadership to defect since the Vietnamese invasion.

"I cannot go back to Kampuchea but I can also not go to the border camps," explained the sad former teacher, who

publicly denounced Hanoi's "intolerable colonialism" in Kampuchea when he came here with his family in 1984.

"I worked under Heng Samrin. The three (guerrilla) parties know who I am — I would be in mortal danger."

As former head of the communist government's propaganda schools, Sek Yen has been refused asylum by western countries.

He and scores of his former pupils living here would be high on any list of Khao-I-Dang residents the three anti-Vietnamese groups would distrust, he said.

But other refugees with no political background also fear the move to the border.

"The guerrillas accuse people who live here of betraying their country because they do not fight," said a teacher who asked not to be named.

"Some don't want to fight, some did fight with the resistance but got into disputes and deserted," he said, referring to factional fighting within some of the groups.

"I want to join my relatives in Philadelphia."

In Thavorith, a 32-year-old pedicab driver whose hair was gray after three years in Phnom Penh prison, said he simply had to get away from Kampuchea.

"I was picked up for no reason and tortured," he said, shaking his head as he slowly recounted his ordeal in jail.

Although Suwit said the closing date for Khao-I-Dang was set, he did not yet know when the refugees would move and who would go to which camps.

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COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

SUSPECTED KHMER BANDITS KILLED, CAPTURED

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 10 Dec 86 p 3

[Excerpt]

Aranyaprathet — A suspected Khmer bandit was killed and four others captured after a clash with security forces in Ta Phraya district yesterday.

The clash came after district chief officer Thavorn Pothisombat called in an 18-man unit of Border Patrol Police, volunteers and forestry officials to investigate logging near Ban Nong Pak Waen.

The unit encountered 10 Khmer bandits and in an ensuing 30-minute clash, one was shot dead and four were caught while trying to escape. Four M46 hand grenades were found near the dead man.

Sources said the bandits had been terrorising villagers near the border.

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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

TOURISTS REPORT CONDITIONS AROUND ANGKOR WAT

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 27 Dec 86 p 2

[Text]

WESTERN tourists made a rare visit to Kampuchea's famed Angkor temple this week but said security concerns kept most of its architectural wonders off limits.

The tourists were speaking to reporters in Bangkok after making the first Western tour excursion to the site in two years.

Control of the Angkor Wat (temple) area is claimed by both the Hanoi-backed Phnom Penh government and opposing Khmer Rouge fighters from a UN-recognised resistance force coalition.

The Khmer Rouge told Reuters last week they attacked Siem Reap airport, 15 km (nine miles) from the temples, but the 13 tourists saw no sign of combat at the airport when they flew in for the visit on Wednesday.

"The visit ~~came~~ off under perfect conditions of security," one tourist quoted tour organiser Janusz Kasmowski as saying.

The group's eight-day trip to Ho Chi Minh City and Phnom Penh, including a half-day at Angkor Wat, was the first of a series of 12 planned until May by orbitours of Australia.

The group spent three hours inspecting the 800-year old monument's five huge towers, extensive bas-reliefs and about 1,500 carved "aparases" — celestial dancers carved in stone that are considered artistic jewels of the 9th to 13th century Angkor era.

The Khmer Rouge said they rocketed the airport last Friday and next day destroyed a Vietnamese military base guarding access to the 25-km by 8-km (15-mile by 5-mile) temple complex.

"The rebels have been pushed back to the Thai border," Angkor's Kampuchean curator told the group, a European woman in the tour party said. She declined to be named.

The curator added that monks lived safely in a Buddhist monastery a few hundred metres (yards) from the ruins.

But the tourist said security was

clearly a problem near the temples in north-west Kampuchea. Authorities told her that a hoped-for trip to huge stone portraits three km (two miles) away at Bayon temple was not possible for security reasons.

One resident of the area, referring to the Khmer Rouge, whispered to her that "creeping tigers are everywhere."

He added that fear of landmines and guerrilla snipers kept people from visiting other monuments in the same complex.

The Khmer Rouge, the coalition's main fighters, warned in October they could not guarantee the safety of tourists visiting the ruins of Angkor.

Few foreign visitors have seen Angkor Wat since Kampuchea became embroiled in almost non-stop turmoil in the 1970s.

Hanoi and Phnom Penh are anxious to demonstrate to Western nations increasingly concerned about the state of preservation of the temples that the Angkor area has been "pacified."

The tourist said she saw a number of anti-aircraft gun sites along the Siem Reap-Angkor road but no armed soldiers along the route. Prior to the tour's return to Phnom Penh, however, a squad of Vietnamese soldiers climbed aboard a Soviet-made Mi-8 helicopter and flew away as the tourists' plane prepared to take off.

The Angkor civilisation flourished between the 9th and 13th centuries under a dozen kings, but was then abandoned and its ruins swallowed up by jungle.

A major restoration of the Angkor Complex by a French-led team of more than 1,000 archeologists and workers began in 1908 but ended in 1972 because of war.

Phnom Penh authorities told the tourists that Indian experts were expected to resume restoration of the reddish-grey stonework in January after several delays.

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CSO: 4200/257

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

COLUMNIST VIEWS GROWTH, LEGITIMACY OF PRK: CGDK PROBLEMS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 27 Dec 86 p 4

[Article by Jacques Bekaert]

[Excerpt]

Legally, the People's Republic of Kampuchea has little claim to existence. But in fact it does — with crucial Vietnamese assistance, it controls most of the national territory, every major city and province. So it would be a little absurd to pretend that it does not exist. How deep the control is, how far it goes and how faithful its administration and army have been, is hard to judge. One can assume that the middle-rank cadres, bureaucrats and civil servants of the PRK, which make up a large portion, are just plain good citizens trying to survive in a country that has received more than its share of suffering. They are survivors from a variety of previous regimes, and so far, given the circumstances, they have 'not performed too badly.

The PRK government certainly has at least as many competent people as the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea. They are probably no less nationalistic and patriotic and probably equally worried about the future of their country.

Take, for instance, the new First Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Dith Munthy, whose appointment to replace Kong Korm was confirmed recently by the official agency SPK.

According to one of our sources, before 1975 Dith Munthy was a judge. In 1979 he became the deputy director-general of SPK; then in 1981 the first PRK ambassador to India before returning to

the Foreign Ministry in 1982. He then worked at the USSR-Eastern European desk and soon was deputy minister in charge of personnel. It is not sure whether he is a party member.

REPLACE

There is no such doubt about the new deputy defence minister, Mr Keo Kim Yan. Appointed a couple of weeks ago to replace Koy Buntha, the new minister, Keo Kim Yan was a secretary of the Battambang provisional party committee and even presented a report at the 5th party congress in October 1985, when he joined the rank of the Central Committee.

Should one day a national reconciliation government be formed, a Western diplomat told us recently, the core of the ministries should come from the PRK, with a few people from the DK, the FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF. A sympathiser of the nationalist resistance, he believed they had few men who would be as dedicated as some of the young PRK ministers now working in Phnom Penh.

His view — not totally unusual — was that so far the performance of most CGDK ministers, members of information offices and other related organisations around the world, has been at best undistinguished. "Kampuchea needs Sihanouk. But in recent history the

"Khmer bourgeoisie has demonstrated little more than its preoccupation with itself. Communists, at least, have some sense of discipline."

He put his hope in some of the youngest nationalist elements, the new commanders, people untainted by fraternal rivalries and civil struggles and, in general, people on every side who still remember they are fighting for their country rather than their pocket, their people rather than their career.

To be fair, it should be pointed out that while internal struggles are openly exposed and minor details can easily be reported day after day when such struggles take place within the ranks of nationalist, non-communist organisations, little or nothing is known about similar events possibly affecting the more secretive communist parties, being the Khmer Rouge or the Party in Phnom Penh.

It should also be remembered that the CGLK government is hardly a government at all and that there is very little space for

well-intentioned individuals to do anything of substance.

All of the above is probably of little relevance to the present situation. War still prevails. An endless war with few battles of substance, a war of poor armies and people fighting for the control of an exhausted country. A lot of things have taken place which go largely unreported. The war has no glamour, journalists have little access to it. But from recent reports coming from places as diverse as Hanoi, Bangkok, Phnom Penh or Peking, it is a war that does not go too well. Nobody is winning it. Nobody seems to be able to bring it to a quick end. Allies are more than often objective enemies while alleged enemies are helping one another. Sometimes it looks as though everyone is fighting everyone else.

"However... it looks increasingly like the Sihanoukists of the ANS plus some of the KPNLF soldiers and the draftees of the Heng Samrin army have more in common than anyone else," said the diplomat.

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CSO: 4200/257

RENEWING STATE MACHINERY, DEVELOPING TOURISM SUGGESTED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 28 Oct 86 pp 1, 4

[Excerpts from speech by Le Van Quynh, deputy chief, Rural Affairs Section of the Municipal CPV Committee: "Renewing the Machinery of Organization, Investing More in Nha Be-Duyen Hai Area, and Developing Tourism Suggested"]

[Text] 1. What are the ideological views that have exerted influence and made the party and state machinery of organization grow larger everyday and the way to do work overlap while lowering work efficiency, with the socioeconomic norms and objectives failing to materialize, the standard of living remaining unstable, and the confidence in the party, government, and even mass organizations being further reduced?

As we combine all of the results announced everyday of production and business activities and of caring for the people's living conditions, we are supposed to find that the situation gets better everyday, but the reality worsens everyday: Words are one thing, but making them come true is another thing.

According to argument we must organize numerous committees, ministries, and services in order to be in a position to go more deeply into specialization and to have higher productivity, efficiency, and quality everyday, but there is no coordination among these committees, ministries, and services, which duplicate and block the work of one another because of professional monopoly, specialization, and special rights leading to paralyzed production and business and creating negative aspects in society and a declining standard of living.

Is it the leaning to the form and boasting aimed at making people see that we have grown strong and mature and have achieved a high degree of specialization, while actually the more we are divided and small-minded, the more strength we will lose--we may have the reputation but no actual assets?

There also is the impression that we must give birth to and establish many committees, ministries, and services in order to have places to accommodate those cadres who have done a great deal for the revolution and the resistance, although when the revolution turned to a new stage, many cadres have failed to keep pace with the new needs because of inadequate background and capabilities and have become a "hindrance" to progress. Is it a remnant of the feudal

class concept without a clear policy aimed at properly treating these respectable cadres so that the able ones could hold new positions that suit their capabilities?

Another thing is that our country presently has very many PhD's, professors, graduate and college students, scientific and technical research institutes, social research institutes and that throughout the country there have been very many scientific seminars, and so on. But why do our production, business, and society remain in place and tend to become worse than before? This is a "big false step."

Does it mean the appearance of a form of thinking leaning toward being formal and boasting? When we find that in other countries the heads of committees and ministries are professors and PhD's, we quickly elevate to similar heights our men, who actually do not deserve such positions, have not made any positive contributions to the country, and have not done any valuable work, in order to create equality and respect during international deals and contacts.

If our ideological views really include such a thinking, we have in fact engaged in lying to ourselves. Starting from poverty, a lack of capital, and small-scale production, we need to take appropriate steps, to know how to make breakthroughs, and to fight against formalism and boasting and a machinery that is too cumbersome to move to the detriment of production and business.

2. Through survey and planning the Duyen Hai-Nha Be area can be made into a major marine-and-sea-products area for raising, catching, and processing for export of such products. This is a great source of income, with fast development of usefulness and retrieval of capital. Let us ask the Central Committee to adopt an appropriate policy in this regard.

In a similar move, let us propose to the Central Committee a greater concentration on investing in the Mekong River delta to produce more grain early, to be self-sufficient in regard to a major need, and to create peace of mind and confidence among the people. To invest in and to exploit the strengths of eastern Nam Bo and the Central Highlands in terms of short- and long-term industrial crops, which the natural conditions there favor: rubber, coffee, cacao, coconut, tea, tobacco, pepper, leguminous and medicinal plants, and so on.

The Soviet Union, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, and Poland have recently joined with us in raising a number of crops of strategic value, but on our side there have been negative aspects and inaction; we think that we must immediately and firmly replace these poor cadres in charge with those cadres who are resourceful and active, dare to do things and to be responsible, and know how to exploit the strengths of, to rely on, and to take good care of workers in their sector.

Because of a lack of appropriate investment and exploitation policies and measures we have failed in the last 11 years, which are a long time, to transform the potentials of the South in general, and the Mekong River delta, eastern Nam Bo, and Central Highlands in particular, into riches to benefit the country. This is a noticeable failure of the investment policies.

3. Since after the day of total liberation we have been talking about doing business in tourism.

Eleven years have passed and yet even the draft political report of the CPV Central Committee for the Sixth Party Congress does not mention it.

In recent years in some socialist countries like Bulgaria and Hungary the number of tourists coming over from abroad annually exceeded their population and the state in those countries had considerable income in foreign currencies.

Bulgaria which has a population of 9 million had nearly 10 million tourists a year. Hungary, with a population of more than 11 million, had nearly 14 million tourists a year.

Let us suppose that in 1987 half a million tourists will visit Vietnam and spend about 500 dollars per person, we will then get 250 million dollars and have more jobs in such sectors as hotel services, gift sales, air, sea, and land transportation, sightseeing, and so on.

Tourism is a business sector that seldom requires raw materials and yet brings about large quantities of foreign currencies. And if we are to earn 250 million dollars from export of farm products, let us figure out how much we will need in terms of materials, raw materials, and labor.

Consequently, we propose that the Sixth Party Congress include tourism in the set of state enterprise norms.

Let us emphasize a number of immediate proposals that should be considered and decided about right away in order to enable a fast development of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries in the rural areas of our municipality.

1. A policy of making investment for immediate purposes can quickly boost productivity and output:

This is a policy of investing materials and raw materials in sufficient quantities and on a timely basis for the benefit of production and setting prices to encourage production.

The rural areas of our municipality (or other municipalities throughout the country), with the same amount of labor and crop-growing method as they have now, can certainly boost their output by 20-25 percent if more fertilizers are made available as investment in the same cultivated area. For what reasons do we let this waste exist? Our soil is still hungry for fertilizer and if it is properly fed, it will yield more product, and if there are other factors like new varieties, biological techniques, better care, and so on, productivity will certainly be higher.

Insecticide, gas and oil, and electric power must satisfy the need for growing crops on schedule and the needs of individual crops, for every crop has its own schedule and its own harmful insects and diseases. If a schedule is

missed or a need is not fulfilled in time, production will certainly be adversely affected.

Let us propose that favorable conditions be created for agriculture to maintain balance by itself so as to actively develop production through export.

2. A policy of taking proper care of the in end in order to fully control the out end:

It is necessary to abolish the policy of having accumulation at both in and out ends because it irrationally forces producers to do things and even exploits them, if we can say so.

We set the policy of giving one part of urea fertilizer in exchange for three parts of paddy but if producers are not willing to exchange and leave their ricefields hungry for fertilizer, both the state and they will suffer.

Some countries have an excess of grain because they have the right policy of properly investing in the in end, such as 1 urea fertilizer being exchanged for .8 paddy, or in urea fertilizer for 1 paddy, and because the soil has enough fertilizer, the crop yield is high. Because the state purchases paddy at agreed prices, it has not only enough grain but also an excess of it to export. If we still maintain the policy of having accumulation at both ends, prices will certainly be pushed up.

3. A price policy must be able to encourage development of production, or else it will render production ineffective:

In 1986, the country in general and our municipality in particular have suffered a great deal from the extremely high price of granulated sugar. The reason for this was that while the cost of sugar cane production was 100 for farmers, we allowed purchases at only 60 or 70, which forced some farmers to destroy or burn their crop and to quit growing sugar cane out of being angry. Our municipality had only more than 2,000 hectares of sugar cane left, instead of nearly 8,000 hectares. So far 7,000 hectares have become useless.

This is a very understandable lesson, and perhaps we all remember the time when table salt was hard to find because producers had given up salt making due to improper prices to look for other work to do to earn their living.

4. The foreign exchange policy of 7/3 or 8/2 for export marine products calculated on the basis of turnovers is totally irrational because the more production is stepped up, the greater the losses will be. We propose that calculations be made on the basis of profits and that producers be allowed to use the value of foreign currency they have earned to further develop production.

5. There must be correct views on cadres' work: We must affirm that we have had lately very many shortcomings in cadres' work ranging from elementary and advanced training to promotion, use, and management. The negative aspects that had appeared were not stopped in time. Opportunistic behavior, flattery,

factionalism, abuse of power, and authoritarianism were not openly denounced, with many localities at times covering them up in a meticulous or brazen manner or just ignoring them.

The method of evaluating cadres is old-fashioned and either tasteful or tasteless.

We must admit that the working people and the masses around our cadres today have acquired a rather high degree of progress, but cadres as a whole seem to be at a standstill because of subjectivity, superficial evaluation of the masses, and the tendency to impose their decision and a lack of firmness in replacing those cadres who have failed to fulfill their task or have shown declining morality, which leads to a lack of confidence on the part of the masses in our cadres and the party.

Reception of the people is not being done in a thorough manner and remains a formality.

The self-criticisms offered by the Municipal CPV Committee in regard to cadres' work are too generalized, lack any serious analyses and do not look for roots and reasons, and must be reinforced to become more complete.

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SECURITY, DEFENSE GOALS OUTLINED FOR HO CHI MINH CITY

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 29 Oct 86 pp 1, 4

[Excerpts from speech by Tran Man, commander, Ho Chi Minh City armed forces: "Winning the Multifaceted War of Destruction Is Our Municipality's Important Need and Goal"]

[Text] To win the multifaceted war of destruction of the expansionists, who are colluding with the American imperialists, is our municipality's most important need and goal because it is one of the key targets for enemy destruction. In this kind of war, the enemy are destroying us in many fields, from many directions, in many locations, and by means of many extremely dangerous and shrewd tricks and maneuvers. They seek to destroy us in the economic, political, ideological, military, diplomatic, cultural, and way-of-life fields, particularly our economy, politics, ideology, and culture.

They strengthen spying activities and send from the sea and from Thailand into our country teams of commando spies, who are to collect intelligence information, to get in touch with counterrevolutionaries, and to carry out disturbances, insurgency, and overthrowing activities. They take advantage of our economic difficulties; use hoodlums, decadent and deviant elements, and social ills to worsen the negative phenomena in our socioeconomic life; and actively resort to psychological warfare to cause disturbances, to sow pessimism and confusion among the people, and to divide the people from the party, the solidarity bloc of three Indochinese states, and our country from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The situation in our municipality from 1983 until now has shown more clearly such acts of sabotage. In recent years, with vigilance and continued offensive, the armed forces and public security force of the municipality succeeded in breaking up tens of newly-established organizations engaging in reactionary political activities.

A survey made in 12 out of 18 precincts and districts in regard to the state of social order in the municipality showed that the number of illegal residents was quite large.

This situation creates additional complexities in connection with political security and social order and security.

The strength of the all-people national defense must be the combined strength of national independence and socialism. We must build and ceaselessly perfect the working people's socialist collective ownership system, with the people being the roots and with the spirit of "The people as a whole defend the fatherland and build the country" and "The people as a whole build the country and defend the fatherland" as suggested by Truong Chinh, general secretary of the CPV Central Committee, at the recent All-Army Party Organization Congress. I think that in the coming years the municipality's local defense work must be concentrated on the following basic tasks:

1. The municipality must fulfill the very basic need of the party in the period of construction and defense of the fatherland, namely, to closely combine the labor obligation with the obligation to defend the fatherland. Every citizen has an obligation to work and to defend the fatherland. The people as a whole both defend the fatherland and do productive work. The municipality as a whole--with every precinct, district, and production installation--is both a work site for socialist construction and a battlefield ready to defeat any enemy.
2. In order to implement the Council of Ministers' decree on planning for mobilization of the national economy and on being always ready to fight the war of aggression, any locality that does not yet have a component in charge of the mobilizing task must organize such a component right away.
3. To educate the people about national defense is not yet carried out in a regular and permanent manner. To feel discouraged and reluctant still exists among the youths. Some families whose children are fulfilling their military obligation still do not fully understand it, nor feel proud of it. Although the number of deserters gradually decreases, desertion still exists. About preparing young people for military service, the great majority of localities have a sound concept and a good sense of responsibility, but still some localities go after quantities. Some organs and enterprises refuse to take back their own men who left and now after having completed their military obligation return to the locality. We propose that all precincts and districts take the men who have fulfilled their military obligation and put them into vocational schools so as to help them to stabilize their living and to have jobs early, which facilitates the mobilization of other youths. We must have close management of this force so that we could quickly bring them into the army if necessary. To teach national defense in general middle schools is a long-term and necessary job, and so far we have just begun to do it, with level-III schools in some localities having not yet put the military training program into their curricula.
4. About building the armed forces, because the military line of our party is that on the people's war, we must build and consolidate the people's armed forces to make them stronger in every aspect.

Our municipality must concentrate its efforts on building the following armed forces:

a. To build the centralized armed forces: Each year it recruits the number of men as required to deliver them to the army, with special attention paid to quality.

b. To build a strong and widespread reserve force, with permanent units being of divisional, regimental, and multibattalion levels.

c. To build the militia and self-defense forces as a strategic force.

5. In order to build totally strong armed forces in the present situation all our echelons and sectors must be responsible for providing the armed forces with invested capital, technology, and a plan for promoting the defense-based economy so as to actively resolve problems having to do with the everyday life of cadres and combatants in our armed forces. We must do the work related to the army's rear-area policy in a more realistic manner so as to create favorable conditions for our cadres and combatants to feel reassured while fulfilling the task of defending their fatherland.

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TEXTILE MILL WORKER MAKES HARSH COMMENTS AT PARTY MEETING

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 28 Oct 86 p 1

[Article: "Urgent Matters Having To Do With Production and Workers' Living Conditions"]

[Text] Editor's note: At the Municipal Party Organization Congress, during the discussions in the morning of 26 October 1986 in the conference hall, Truong Thi Duyen, a 27-year-old textile mill worker head of shift A at Chan A Textile Enterprise and one of the 28 delegates being workers directly involved in production, addressed the audience. She made her comments without a prepared text. We have jotted down her main ideas as follows:

I am not used to expressing myself in front of a large group, so please understand if I do not speak very smoothly.

Being a worker in the textile sector, an important industry in our municipality, first of all I want to talk about production. The fact that not enough raw materials were supplied for production has made us encounter many difficulties. Earlier in the year when there was not enough work to do, many workers had to stay home and to get 70 percent of their wages, but later in the year when raw materials were available, we all had to sprint as we strived to meet deadlines.

The second thing is the life of workers today is very difficult. The fast increasing prices make our wages insufficient to feed our families. It is very hard to buy anything with 5 dong to cook a between-shifts meal. This state of things forces many workers to work both in the enterprise and outside with an additional job in order to earn a living, and therefore it is difficult to ensure their health and the quality of their work. Housing for workers is also another matter that needs to be talked about. For many workers this is a very difficult matter, but in the meantime we see that many cadres in high positions live in houses that are too large. How can these cadres set good examples for the people to follow? For honest soldiers, public security officers, medical doctors, and teachers, life today is very difficult. The leading cadres must reduce arranging things for their own interests.

Another thing we propose for the attention of the congress is to educate and raise the knowledge and cultural standard of workers. Today because their cultural standard and knowledge are very low, it is difficult for them to take part in the general management of the enterprise and our municipality.

The last thing for me to say is that I have found that we usually talk very well, very well indeed. Right at this congress, many ideas that were expressed and many texts that were written are very nice, but we must try to realize our words at any cost and to make words go hand in hand with action if we want to make the people trust us.

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PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO MAKE DECISIONS, SELECT LEADERS SUGGESTED

Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 29 Oct 86 p 1

[Article by Minh Tuan: "Materializing the People's Collective Ownership Power"]

[Text] Our ancestors had a saying, "It is the people who push the boat and it is also the people who make it capsize." The party line says, "The party leads, the people are masters, the state manages." Recently Truong Chinh had this to emphasize: "We must consider the people as the root." Therefore, let me further discuss the people's collective ownership right.

About uncovering negative phenomena, for more than half a year since the mass movement to make contributions to the party was launched, the people have denounced the wrongdoings of a number of people in positions of authority. In whose names did they dare to purge denouncers, to impose harsh treatment on tens of families, and to send people who had refused to side with them to mental hospitals in order to shut off potential sources of information? Those facts that appeared in the press have shocked an unknown large number of people. And this is a loss for the party.

The fact that the roots--the people and the economy--have been shaken in the recent stage has affected quite greatly the top--social morality. And through our people's recent contributions, we now realize that they know everything and can make contributions about any subjects and that how much they are interested in the party congress.

The people know everything!

Much has been talked about the people's collective ownership right, but why do negative phenomena still exist? Some people occupying positions of authority continue to trample on the masses. This is because there exist ambiguities in the ownership right concept that have not yet been clarified. This ownership right does not include the right to make real decisions about negative phenomena, as well as to select one's leaders. It must be materialized. For instance, in considering the qualifications of a party member or a director, the collectivized masses must be allowed to cast secret votes. Naturally we do not have to wait until we have 100 percent of the votes of confidence before we are assigned work to do, but the selected persons must have at least

50 percent of the votes of confidence. Only then can the party be considered a party of the masses and collective, become every person's confidence and reason to live, and remain strong from the basic level up. We believe that if this is the case, a number of incompetent leaders and bad party members will quickly be eliminated by the masses right at the basic level, instead of the provincial and central levels where the examining process usually takes a long time. There will be no waiting for the 14th group of inspectors to come along to clarify things, as what actually happened in the case of a director in Thanh Hoa.

The collective ownership right as mentioned in the above example is a sharp weapon in the hands of the masses. The number of votes shows the degree of confidence given to a leader and at the same time is a binding that holds him responsible toward the masses. To positively determine the masses' collective ownership right is an urgent job to be done in order to turn the principle of "the party leads, the working people are masters, the state manages" into an organic relationship.

In the future we hope an era will open in which the party leads on the basis of the masses' self-leadership.

In the future the masses' collective-ownership sun will reign, sweep away darkness in every alley and corner, and remove all ugly black umbrellas to deprive the bats of individualism of any hiding places. This light will shine bright to radiate the halo of the precious stones that are the true talents from the working people, which socialism is greatly in need of.

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INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Đỗ An [DOOX AN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Văn An [NGUYEENX VAWN AN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Văn Ất [TRAANF VAWN AATS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Bùi Thế Bình [BUIF THEES BINHF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phan Văn Bay [PHAN VAWN BAYR]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lâm Văn Cách [LAAM VAWN CACHS]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86 (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Thị Cảnh [LEE THI CANGH]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Xuân Cần [PHAMJ XUAAN CAANS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Dự [PHAMJ ZUJ]

*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Vinh Phu Province; his article "Vinh Phu's Role in Defeating the War of Sabotage" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 86 p 72)

Bùi Thúc Dường [BUIF THUCS ZUOWNGX], Major General

His article "The Defense of Quang Tri Province in 1972" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 86 p 72)

Trịnh Quang Đô [TRINHJ QUANG DOO]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Vũ Đương [VUX DOWUWNGF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Hoàng Minh Giám [HOANGF MINH GIAMS]

Chairman of the Presidium of the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity and Friendship with People of Other Nations; on 11 Nov 86 he attended the 25th anniversary of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 12 Nov 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Kim Giang [NGUYEENX KIM CIANG]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Vũ Hanh [VUX HANHF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trịnh Quang Hao [TRINHJ QUANG HAOR]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Hợp [PHAMJ HAPJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Thị Hinh [TRAANF THIJ HINH]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Hoàn [TRAANF HOANF]

*Deputy Secretary of the CPV Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 11 Nov he attended the 25th anniversary of the Sandinista National Liberation Front in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 12 Nov 86 p 1).

Đinh Gia Huân [DINH GIA HUAANS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Huệ [LEE HUEEJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trịnh Thái Hưng [TRINHJ THAIS HUWNG]

Standing Member of the CPV Committee, Haiphong; Chairman of the Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Association, Haiphong; on 1 Nov 86 he attended the 65th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in Hai Phong. (NHAN DAN 2 Nov 86 p 1).

Trần Công Kích [TRAANF COONG KICHS]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

*Lê Văn Kiên [LEE VAWN KIEEN]

*CPV Secretary of Long An Province; his article about Long An's experiences with the "Price Subsidies to Wages" policy in 1986 appeared in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 10 Nov 86 p 2).

Nguyễn Trung Kiêu [NGUYEENX TRUNG KIEUR]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Hữu Khai [NGUYEENX HUWUX KHAIR]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Đức Khiêm [NGUYEENX DUWCS KHIEEM]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Đặng Khôi [DAWNG KHOOI]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Quang Khuê [LEE QUANG KHUEE]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Hoàng Xuân Khuyên [HOANGF XUAAN KHUYEEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Thị Liên [PHAMJ THIJ LIEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nghiêm Phú Mạnh [NGHIEEM PHUS MANHJ]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Văn Minh [NGUYEENX VAWN MINH]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Văn Mỹ [NGUYEENX VAWN MI]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Quốc Mậu [NGUYEENX QUOOCS MAAUJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Đinh Hữu Nam [DINH HUUX NAM]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Quang Ngọc [TRAAN QUANG NGOCJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Thị Ngàn [LEE THIJ NGAANO]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Cảm Ngoan [CAAMF NGOAN]

Vice Chairman of the National Assembly; Deputy Chairman of the Nationalities Department of the CPV Central Committee; on 9 Nov 86 he attended a cultural exhibition in Hanoi. (NHAN DAN 10 Nov 86 p 1).

Phạm Quang Nhượng [PHAM QUANG NHUOWNGJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Trọng Phu [NGUYEENX TRONGJ PHU]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86 (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phan Tú Quang [PHAN TUWR QUANG]

Deputy Head of the Oil and Gas General Department; recently he gave medals to Russian sailors. (NHAN DAN 11 Nov 86 p 1).

Đỗ Thị Hồng Rây [DOOK THIJ HOONGF RAAY]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Bùi Xuân Sơn [BUIF XUAAN SOWN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Khắc Sung [PHAMJ KHAWCS SUNGR]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86 (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Vũ Tinh [VUX TINHS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Tích [TRAANF TICHS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Tiên [NGUYEEN TIEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Mạnh Tiên [TRAAN MANH TIEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phan Quang Tiếp [PHAN QUANG TIEEFJ], Major General

His article "The Military Organization and Productive Labor" appeared in the cited source. (TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Oct 86 p 72)

Bùi Phúc Tựu [BAUINGJ PHUCS TUWUJ]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Tô Xuân Toàn [TOO XUAAN TOANF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Đào Tuân [DAOF TUAAN]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Thành Túc [NGUYEENX THANH TUCS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Bùi Tuệ [DOOX TUEES]

*Vice Chairman of the People's Committee, Hoang Lien Son Province; his article about the road system in his province appeared in the cited source. (GIAO THONG VAN TAI 6 Nov 86 p 1).

Vũ Gia Tham [VUX GIA THAM]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lai Xuân Thể [LAJ XUAN THEES]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phan Xuân Thực [PHAMJ XUAN THUWCJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Hà Trí Thực [HAF TRIS THUWCS]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Thủ Đóng [NGUYEENX THUWONGCF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Trọng Thi [LEE TRONGJ THI]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Công Thìn [TRAANF COONG THINF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Như Thọ [NGUYEENX NHUW THOJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

*Lê Xuân Thu [LEE XUAAN THUJ]

*Secretary of the CPV Committee; Vice Chairman of the Vietnamese Soviet Friendship Association of College of Communication and Transportation; on 1 Nov 86 he attended a meeting to commemorate the 66th anniversary of the Soviet Revolution. (NHAN DAN 2 Nov 86 p 4)

Phạm Trọng Thuân [PHAMJ TRONGJ THUAAN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Đô Hữu Thuận [DOOX HUWUX THUAANJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Đức Thụy [PHAMJ DUWCS THUYJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Thị Thêu [NGUYEENX THIJ THEEU]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Đức Triều [NGUYEENX DUWCS TRIEEUF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Đình Trọng [NGUYEENX DINHF TRONGJ]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Trần Văn Truyền [TRAANF VAWN TRUYEENF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Thị Toàn [NGUYEENX THI J TOANF]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; she was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Nguyễn Như Xuyên [NGUYEENX NHUW XUYEEN]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Phạm Như Xuyên [PHAMJ NHUW XUYEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Đinh Kim Yên [DINH KIM YEEN]

Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

Lê Văn Yên [LEE VAWN YEENR]

Alternate Member of the Executive Committee of the CPV Committee, 4th Term, Ha Nam Ninh Province; he was elected to this position at the Ha Nam Ninh Party Congress held on 21-25 Oct 86. (Nam Dinh HA NAM NINH 28 Oct 86 p 1).

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